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1. Abstract 
We assess whether underpricing and long-long performance of Norwegian IPOs differs across 
private equity-backed and non-backed firms. Our sample consists of 67 backed firms and 298 
non-backed firms, floated in the period from 1996 to 2010. We observe marginally lower 
underpricing of both smaller and larger backed IPOs, though statistically insignificant. We 
find that riskier issues exhibit higher underpricing, independent of firm size and private equity 
involvement. IPOs backed by private equity does not exhibit better long-run performance. On 
the contrary, both larger and smaller IPOs underperforms both relative to the OSEBX index 
and other IPOs, where especially larger IPOs exhibit severe underperformance in the five years 
following the public offering. While our full-sample regressions return insignificant negative 
excess alphas for backed relative to non-backed IPOs, time-varying rolling regressions display 
significant underperformance of private equity backed IPOs during both financial crises 
covered by our sample.     
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Figure 1.1) Categories of Private-Equity 
ECON Analysis (2004) 
 
2. Private Equity 
Private Equity (PE) is a collective term for an asset class consisting of equity and debt, pooled 
in funds, and reinvested in privately traded companies. PE-funds often have a long-term 
perspective and usually apply an active ownership-structure to the invested firm. The main 
objective is to enhance firm value, usually through financial, operational, organizational and 
strategic improvements, prior to realizing the profits through various exits. PE usually sorts 
into two main categories depending on their position in the life cycle and future needs. 
 
 
Venture Capital [VC]  
VC-funds invests in companies operating in the start-up or growth phase. In the former case, 
VCs supply capital and competence related to the development of business concepts and 
prototypes, while the latter case involves financing of further product/service development 
and introductory marketing. Newly established companies often have difficulties accessing 
the capital markets to obtain financing, due to lacking a financial history, marked relations, 
management- and organizational skills, tangible assets and earnings. This may deter the 
banking industry and other financial institutions, due to substantial uncertainty surrounding 
future earnings estimates.  Private equity functions as an alternative way of accessing the 
Private Equity
Venture Capital Leveraged Buyouts
Seed
Start-
up/Growth
Expansion Consolidation New expansion
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capital market, while simultaneously offering highly skilled and specialized human capital. 
This is often conditional on the fund obtaining a controlling share.  
VCs aid further development and expansion, often undertaking a significant risk concerning 
market entry and expansion of new and/or existing markets. Companies in these stages often 
require expertise, enabling them to commercialize technology and distribute products/services 
to markets on a national or international scale. Further, VCs often specialize in selected sets 
of industries, which in turn determines the composition of their portfolios. International studies 
claim that VCs add value through; key-employee recruitment, identification of suppliers, 
development of customer relations and assistance in production. We elaborate on these results 
further ahead. Representatives from the VC-funds often serve at the company´s board of 
directors, reflecting their hands on approach, active ownership and management. 
Leveraged Buyouts [LBOs]  
LBOs occurs in the later stages of a firm’s life cycle, often among companies that have had 
historically strong earnings, but due to market conditions or poor management, have 
experienced a recent- or prolonged downturn. LBO management teams often aim at 
development and restructuring to improve the strategy and operations of their portfolio firms. 
LBOs often leads to concentrated ownership, and the application of leverage is common, to 
overcome the free-rider problem, mitigate agency conflicts and align incentives, as proposed 
by Grossman and Hart (1980) and further developed by Müller and Panunzi (2004). In effect, 
financial structures often deviates from the market’s norm levels. The application of leverage 
is not as pronounced among ventures, where contractual relationships with entrepreneurs are 
of higher-order importance.  
In general, LBO- and VC-funds mainly operate outside the public capital market, which 
effectively limits disclosure requirements surrounding financial- and earnings statements. The 
funds usually acquires a controlling interest of the targeted company, and actively manage 
operations, while collecting a management fee and carried interest1 for their services. 
                                                 
1 Carried interest accumulates in addition to management fees, and usually amounts to 20 % of the fund’s annual profit, 
subsequent to providing investors with an initially agreed upon rate of return. Management fees covers the costs of operating 
the fund, while the carried interest serves as the primary source of income for the fund’s manager.  
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Fund/inv. management 
Ownership of the fund 
Figure 1.2) Private Equity Structure and Organization  
Demaria (2010) 
 
The fund’s ownership of the portfolio investments 
Concentration of ownership combined with carried interest reduces informational 
asymmetries and aligns incentives between management and owners/investors.  
The roles of managers (General Partners [GPs]) and investors (Limited Partners [LPs]) 
separates in the following way; LPs provides capital, while GPs control daily operations. In 
contrast to public corporate structures, some claim that GPs are likely to manage their portfolio 
companies relatively more efficiently, due to incentives alignment and reduced agency 
conflicts. 
In the following, we address LBOs as “PE”, seed/ventures as “VC” and non-backed IPOs as 
“NB”. “Private equity” refers to the cohort of seed, ventures and leveraged buyouts, applied 
when we do not distinguish between PE and VC. 
2.1 Private Equity Funds’ Structure and Organization  
Below, we have illustrated how private equity actors typically organize their funds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GPs and LPs fulfil distinct and separate roles.  GPs are responsible for identifying attractive 
targets and maintaining everyday management. LPs do not influence daily operations as it 
might jeopardize their limited liability status, effectively inflicting responsibility beyond their 
Private Equity 
Firm (General 
Partner)
Private Equity Fund
(Limited Partnership)
Investment Investment
Limited Partners
(public pension funds, corporate pension funds, insurance 
companies, high net-worth individuals, family offices, 
endowments, foundations, fund-of-funds, sovereign 
wealth funds, etc.)
Investment
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committed capital. Before and during the funds’ lifetime, investors commit capital for several 
years, and might be subject to capital-calls2 depending on the contractual relationship. Funds’ 
maturities are determined in the contract regulating the relationship between GPs and LPs, and 
usually range from 8 to 12 years [Cendrowki et.al, (2008)]. The fund undergoes various stages, 
demonstrated by the figure below: 
 
.      
Years 0 - 1,5      Years 1 – 4          Years 2- 7               Years 4 - 10  
 
Figure 1.3) Private Equity Funds’ Stages 
Cendrowski et al (2008) 
Organization/Fundraising: PE/VC-funds rarely trades on public stock exchanges, with the 
exception of a limited few. Hence, fund promoters have to pool money from investors by 
pitching their strategy and investment focus, which in turn determines their marketplace for 
investments. This includes industry, stage (PE or VC) and geographical focus3. These focus 
areas are held constant and rarely changes through the fund’s lifetime without any 
collaboration with the LPs. Regulatory restrictions often limits PE/VC-funds’ from marketing 
their fund raising, inducing “word-of-mouth” among LP-networks as the primary source of 
promotion.  
Investments: GPs scout for firms, with the objective of finding suitable and potentially 
profitable investments, coinciding with their focus areas and strategies. Careful considerations 
of the potential for adding value is important.  Often, PE/VC-actors’ portfolios consists of few 
firms (fewer among PEs relative to VCs), due to limited input factors, such as human capital 
                                                 
2 When LPs commit a certain amount of capital to a fund, the act of transferring the funds rarely occurs ex ante. Capital calls 
occurs when GPs require the LPs’ committed capital, usually while awaiting favorable market conditions to provide attractive 
targets, in the intermediate period.  
3 E.g., Hitecvision, a Norwegian PE-actor, has chosen to focus their investments in the international oil and gas industry, 
primarily within small and medium capitalized firms in the oilfield services- and technology sector 
Organization/
Fundraising
Investment Management Harvest
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and time, which in turn increases idiosyncratic risk. Syndication among VCs is common, as it 
mitigates this form of risk exposure. Usually, one VC-actor will initiate the lead and hold a 
controlling interest. Barry et.al (1990) finds that leading VCs on average obtain 19% 
ownership while the aggregated ownership by the syndicate is approximately 34%. 
Management: After completing the investment stage, the management in charge of the 
targeted firm often experience replacements by professionals from the PE/VC-firm. Barry et. 
al (1990) presents results from the U.S. where, on average, one third of the board of directors 
is replaced by VCs. The authors also finds that VCs, on average, actively manages the 
established firm half of the lifetime before going public, and serves on the board of directors 
for an average of 35 months. 
Harvest (divestments): Harvesting involves realizing investments by exiting positions within 
the portfolio firms. The most common exit strategies are; sales to strategic buyers, initial 
public offerings (IPOs) and repurchases by founders (buy-backs). In this stage, the LPs 
receives a return on their committed capital. We describe the exit strategies in detail in section 
1.5.  
2.2 History 
The initiation of private equity dates back to 1946 with the formation of American Research 
and Development Corporation (ARD), a publicly traded, closed-end investment company. 
ARD was founded due to concerns of absent long-term financing for new enterprises, and the 
inadequate rate of new start-ups, stemming from the depression in the 1930s and the world 
war of the 40s. Financial institutions accumulated capital instead of reallocating among 
investors and entrepreneurs who had historically played a major role in funding- and starting 
small businesses. Additionally, ARD aimed at providing capital to new businesses with 
sufficient managerial expertise. The founders believed that management skills and expertise 
was equally important to new businesses as capital, in determining success or failure.  
Private equity experienced a troubling start in the 50s and 60s, as rates of return declined due 
to centralized competition, originating from the U.S. governments’ Small Business Investment 
Act of 1958. However, VC investments initiated during the 60s delivered abnormal positive 
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returns when exited through the “hot-issue” IPO-market during 1968-1969. The markets dried 
up in the 70s, resulting in acquisitions of large conglomerates for restructuring- and spin-off 
purposes. PE (LBOs) became a popular form of investment vehicle for facilitating takeovers. 
In addition, Limited Partnerships (LPs) was introduced as a new way of organizing 
investments (Fenn, Liang, and Prowse, 1995). 
The 80s and the 90s, considered the first boom-years for private equity (in terms of fund-
raising activity), followed favourable changes in regulatory frameworks and tax regimes by 
the US government. Capital flows surged to new heights, approaching $17.8 billion by the end 
of the 90s. PE grew rapidly, financed by high-yield debt, effectively driving the boom in PE-
financing, while ending abruptly during 1989 – 1990. A new boom spurred with VC and the 
dot.com-bubble in the period of 1995 to 2000, primarily driven by speculation of institutional 
investors and easily available capital, causing rapidly rising stock prices. The bubble collapsed 
between 2000 and 2001. The period between 2003 and 2007 experienced a resurge of LBO 
deals, mainly due to decreasing interest rates, regulatory changes and loosening credit 
standards. This period saw 13 of the 15 largest LBOs ever performed, but it abruptly ended 
with the financial crisis of 2007 – 2008. Whether or not these deals created value remains an 
open question. 
2.3 Adding Value Beyond Financal Capital? 
How do private equity add value beyond being financial intermediates? This varies, and the 
literature focus on three main groups of activities: (1) Pre-investment screening (2) Monitoring 
and governance activities during the holding period, and (3) exiting activities. 
2.3.1 Private Equity (PE) 
Reduced Agency-Costs / New-Incentives Hypothesis 
In Jensen (1989), the author argues that PE provides new management incentives, as 
demanding debt repayment schedules tightens operations, and reduces leeway for wasteful 
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spending and negative NPV4 investments. Concentrated ownership further facilitate more 
effective monitoring than dispersed ownership.  
Employee Wealth-Transfer Hypothesis 
The theory hypothesizes that the value created from LBOs is at the expense of employees and 
suppliers in the form of layoffs, wage reductions and “squeezing”. Shleifer and Summers 
(1988) coin it “transfer of wealth” when a PE-fund accrues value by acquiring firms and 
redistributing the wealth at the employees and suppliers expense.  
Information Advantage / Underpricing-Hypothesis 
Through superior knowledge and expertise, attained through detailed analysis, the buyout 
specialists may have attained more information about the company than other bidders have 
been able to. Because they have superior information, they can buy the shares for less than 
they would have had if the information were freely available. 
Liquidity Premium 
PE investments trades among privately held funds, hence they are often illiquied. The liquidity 
factor expresses risk associated with the speed at which investors may realize their investments 
to prevent/realize a loss/profit. Pástor and Stambaug (2003) seeks to find if the liquidity 
variable is important in explaining asset returns. In their paper, expected stock returns exhibit 
sensitivity to fluctuations in market-wide liquidity-measures. They provide evidence that the 
liquidity factor relates to expected excess returns unexplained by assets’ sensitivities to the 
market-, growth- and value-factors. Illiquid assets display significantly higher returns and the 
spreads indicates that investors demand a higher risk-premium for holding less liquid assets. 
Pástor and Stambaug (2003) find that smaller firms, on average, exhibit less liquidity, while 
also having the highest sensitivity to aggregate market liquidity. Næs, Skjeltrop and Ødegaard 
(2011) provide insights from both Norway and the U.S. showing that liquidity provides 
information about the current and future state of an economy. They argue that trading of small 
capitalization firms decline during market downturns, as investors tilt towards larger firms, so 
called “flight-to-quality”.  
                                                 
4 Net Present Value: Measure of the present value of a projected cash flow less initial investments.   
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2.3.2 Venture Capital (VC) 
Sapienza (1992) seeks to find if VC-backing adds value, beyond observing post IPO stock 
returns. In the article, it is argued that performance positively correlates with VCs 
involvement; those who maintain frequent and open communication while minimizing conflict 
are the most effective VCs.  Neither CEO experience nor ventures’ stage proved to inflict any 
impact on the value added, on any statistically significant level. When contributing with 
expertise, experience and knowledge the VCs adds more than capital. 
Hellman and Puri (2002) explore how VCs assists their portfolio firms in achieving a more 
professional approach to business, providing evidence from Silicon Valley start-ups. When 
analysing the sample they find several recurring actions that they claim adds value: 
- Adding a marketing VP to the firm 
- Implementing human resource policies 
- Adding stock options plans  
- Replacing inefficient managers 
They also stress the fact that competent VCs are highly skilled in screening firms and are able 
to identify and separate firms that are innovating from those who are imitating. Having a VC 
present also aids the portfolio company in distributing its products/services to relevant markets 
in an efficient and profitable manner.   
 
Table 1.1) Key Differences Between VC (seed/start-ups) and PE (LBOs) 
VC PE
Target Companies High risk, start-ups Underperforming, undervalued
Sectors Mainly information technology, biotech., and 
clean-tech.
Across all industries
Share of Ownership Aquire a minority stake, less than 50% Aquire 100% of the company
Aquistion Structure Equity Combination of Equity and Debt
Life-Cycle Stage Early-stage companies Mature, public companies
Size <$10 million >$100 million
Horizon 7-10 years 4-10 years
Claimed Contributions Human relations, network of connections, 
managment expertise
Operational improvements, management 
expertise
Portfolios Multiple firms Few firms
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2.4 Private Equity in The Nordic Countries 
Unbiased information related to private equity in the Nordic region is not easily attainable, as 
the PE/VC- and related sectors themselves disclose the lion’s share of available information. 
Where possible, we have made an effort in displaying neutral data and information. In this 
section, we will describe how the Nordic region differs from the U.S. region, while also 
elaborating on the state of the Norwegian market and its neighbours. The Nordic countries 
here include Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland.  
2.4.1 How Nordic Private Equity Differs from U.S. Private Equity 
Spliid´s (2013) article study differences between the Nordic countries and the U.S. Existing 
literature on private equity mainly centres on U.S conditions, theory and data. Suman, Sharan, 
and Sachan (2012) examine the state of private equity research for the past seven years by 
studying 284 papers published in the period of 2005 to 2011. The bulk of the data originates 
from the U.S and the United Kingdom5.   
Investment Environment 
- The size of the Nordic M&A market, relative to GDP, is one third lower than in the U.S. 
- The stock market is smaller in both size and depth, expressed by market capitalization and  
.  trading volume, relative to GDP. 
- The judicial systems in the Nordic region is based on civil law, while the U.S system is 
...based on common law.   
- Less connection between productivity and pay, wage determination is more inflexible. 
Fundraising 
- Domestic investors represents the main source of funds for the U.S private equity market.  
..Nordic countries needs to attract international investors to obtain sufficient funds. 
                                                 
5 48.2% originates from North America and 31.7% from Europe. 
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2.4.2 History of Norwegian Private Equity 
Norwegian private equity is a relatively new asset class compared to the status of private equity 
on the international arena. We saw the first signs of a PE-market in Norway during the early 
80s. An extensive state ownership structure and a relatively small stock exchange, contributed 
towards limiting the private equity market prior to this period. Additionally, deregulation of 
the credit market occurred quite late in Norway, compared to the rest of the western world. 
Prior to deregulation, the government restricted available credit to the overall market, while 
simultaneously allocating cheap credit, high-risk loans, subsidies and guarantees freely to a 
few selected industries. Combined with an overall highly levered traditional industry, the 
leeway for a well-functioning private equity market narrowed. These practices lasted until the 
early 80s. Further, with the exception of the most pronounced industries, energy, fish and 
shipping, there were few sectors large enough to support specialized asset management 
groups, effectively deterring foreign private equity-actors in obtaining a foothold.  
Surrounding 1990, the Norwegian government intensified its focus on strengthening the 
capital markets, due to concerns of low equity ratios in the industrial sector. Consequently, it 
founded “Norsk Venture AS” [(Norwegian Venture AS), later Norsk Vekst AS (Norwegian 
Growth AS)], in 1989 with a 49 percent state ownership. The government aimed at raising 
equity to the Norwegian business sector by combining state-, private- , and commercial bank 
capital with expertise. The governments’ involvement with private equity further expanded 
with the founding of SIVA, which provided high-risk financing to start-ups in the Norwegian 
sector. Argentum AS was established in 2001, a fund-of-funds enterprise, investing indirectly 
through other private equity-funds. Additionally, industrial conglomerates such as Orkla, has 
historically contributed towards increasing the frequency of M&As with the purpose of active 
ownership and brand management, similar to private equity.  
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2.4.3 Private Equity Actors 
  
Table 1.2) Overview of Private Equity Companies Located in Norway 2011 
NVCA (2011) 
NVCA defines a Norwegian PE firm as; “…a fund (GP) with headquarters located in 
Norway.” (NVCA, 2011). As of March 2011, there were a total of 46 Norwegian- and 5 foreign 
PE firms located in Norway. We display fundraising according to investor type during 2012, 
in Figure 1.5. 
Management companies located in Norway 
Seed Venture Buyout 
Atech Management AS Alliance Venture Altaria/Foinco 
Bølgen Convexa Borea 
Campus Kjeller Energy Future Invest Credo Partners AS 
Fjord Invest Energy Ventures FSN Capital Partners 
KapNord Ferd Capital Herkules Capital 
LEN/Såkorninvest Midt-Norge ICON Capital Group HitecVision 
Midvestor Management Incitia Ventures Marin Forvaltning 
Norinnova Forvaltning Kistefos Venture NorgesInvestor 
Procom Venture Kverva Norvestor Equity 
Pronord Mallin Venture AS Progressus Management 
ProVenture Management Maturo Kapital Reiten & Co 
Sarsia Seed Management Neomed Management Number of companies: 11 
Sinvent / SINTEF Northzone Ventures   
Spring Management Sarsia Management Foreign Funds with office in Norway 
Sydvestor AS Skagerak Venture Capital Altor Equity Partners 
  Teknoinvest CapMan Norway 
  TeleVenture Management EQT Partners 
  Verdane Capital Nordic Capital/NC Partners AS 
  Viking Venture Ratos AB 
Number of companies: 15 Number of companies: 20 Number of companies: 5 
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Figure 1.5) Fundraising According to Investor Type in Norway (2012) 
NVCA (2012) 
Fund of funds represent the largest fund contributors, with over 30% of the investments in 
private equity, followed by insurance companies and banks. Foreign investments allocated to 
Norwegian private equity-funds typically originates from fund of funds’ investments. We 
have not been able to obtain data on ownership dispersion for fund of funds.  
2.4.4 Market Characteristics 
 
Figure 1.6) The Norwegian Market’s Characteristics 
Total value amount of investments, by phase (Norwegian and foreign Private Equity firms), in Norwegian 
enterprises. Number of initial investments and aggregated average deal value across all phases at the right 
axis. (NVCA, 2012) 
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Figure 1.6 displays the total value amount invested in Norwegian enterprises, reflecting a 
heavily represented buyout segment. Seed investments are almost non-existent, both in terms 
of allocated capital and number of investments, at least during 2011 and 2012. Considering 
the takeover dynamics of mature companies through LBOs (PE), especially regarding capital 
requirements, the emerging picture seems logical. The lines with markers indicates the number 
of initial investments, which makes the contrasts in terms of capital intensity even more 
pronounced. Ventures are most numerous in almost all years, but converges towards LBOs, 
which surpasses ventures by 2012. Seed investments have experienced an almost continuous 
decline during the last five years, exhibiting none during the two last years. Below, we have 
segmented each measure of average deal value6. It seems, during the last years, that increased 
capital allocation to LBOs has expanded average deal size quite heavily, while keeping the 
number of transactions constant, as displayed in Figure 1.6. 
Figure 1.7) Capital Allocations by Phase and Average Investment Value 
Total amount of investments by phase, both Norwegian and foreign PE-firms, and average value of initial 
investments, by phase. NVCA (2012)  
VC deals exhibit a different pattern; variation in aggregated investment value seems to 
precede/follow an increase in the number of deals, while reducing the average deal value, and 
                                                 
6 NB: The topmost line indicate average deal value across all segments, in million NOK, but has its reference point from the 
secondary y-axis, for convenience purposes. 
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in effect more evenly allocating capital among investments. For seeds, all these measures 
positively relates to each other.   
 
Figure 1.8) Differences in Capital Allocation Between VC- and Seed Investments 
Total amount of investments by phase, both Norwegian and Foreign PE-firms, and average value of initial 
investments, by phase. (NVCA, 2012) 
The axes have the same interpretation as in Figure 1.7. The Norwegian private equity sector 
depends on international funding, supported by NVCA’s market survey in 2012, indicating 
that more than half of Norwegian private equity-funds’ capital accrues from investors abroad. 
The trend in foreign to domestic capital-ratio is steadily increasing, except from the recent 
abrupt decline during 2012. 
 
Figure 1.9) Foreign Capital´s Share of New Committed Capital 2002-2012. 
(Source, NVCA 2012) 
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Figure 1.10) Number of Private Equity Investments by Sector  
(Source: NVCA,2010, 2011, 2012, modified) 
National and international private equity funds invests most frequently in the information 
technology- (IT) and cleantech sectors, followed by life sciences and communications, as 
demonstrated by Figure 1.107. The pronounced involvement of PE/VC-funds within these 
sectors differ somewhat from the international arena, as the dominant positions of petroleum 
and cleantech (renewable energy/ environmental technology) reflects Norway’s exposure to 
natural resources. The extensive focus on IT is commonplace, also internationally, as a 
combination of low capital requirements, no physical barriers, potential of relatively high 
returns and growth tend to attract investors. Clearly, this also promotes intense competition.  
Das, Jagannatha and Sarin (2003) study 23 208 unique firms from the US market and identifies 
the top five industries characterized by heavy PE/VC involvement. IT, life science, and 
biotechnology account for over 60% of the total number of investments, which is similar to 
the Norwegian distribution, except for the heavy tilt towards cleantech. 
                                                 
7 The numbers are corrected for companies where funds have co-invested; each observation represents a unique company. 
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2.4.5 Recent Development and Forecasted Trends 
The Nordic private equity market’s assets has grown substantially the last decade. In 2011, 
approximately EUR 79 billion was under the Nordic countries’ asset management, measured 
as capital allocated from investors to funds. Compared to 2003 the assets amounted to 
approximately EUR 32 billion. (Argentum, 2013) 
 
Figure 1.11) Assets Under Management, Nordic Private Equity-funds, 2003 
vs. 2011, and Relative Market Share Within The Nordic Market 
Argentum (2013) 
Sweden has a dominant position among the Nordic Countries, here defined as Norway, 
Sweden, Denmark and Finland. However, by 2011 the Swedish market share of the total PE-
market in the Nordics fell slightly to approximately 66 percent from a share of 70 percent in 
2003. Denmark and Norway experienced the highest growth to approximately EUR 9 billion 
assets under management in 2011 (Argentum, 2013). 
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2.5 Private Equity Exits (Divestments) 
 
Figure 1.12) Overview of Divestments8 (IPOs included in “Other”) 
Source (NVCA, 2008 – 2012) 
Divestments involves the process of realizing investments, fully or partially, through a wide 
variety of possible exit routes. The execution of exits determines the success of the funds’ 
involvement, and the method, timing and investor-approach requires careful planning in order 
to maximize shareholder value. Several considerations have to be taken into account; current 
market conditions, equity- and debt-markets conditions, deal flows, industry sales multiples 
and P/E ratios are some examples of qualitative and quantitative measures often applied to 
determine the attractiveness of a potential exit. For detailed overview of IPO-exits, confer 
Table 4.1. 
                                                 
8 Each category’s color, from top to bottom, correspond to the list aligned at the right, in ascending/descending order.  
0 %
10 %
20 %
30 %
40 %
50 %
60 %
70 %
80 %
90 %
100 %
3
88
3
15
23
23
3
4
2
87
3
4
0
3
5
4
3
1
3
5
4
5
5
2
4
10
7
10
18
11
19
18
Sale to trade buyers
(industrial sale)
Sale to another equity
firm
Sale of qouted equity
post flotation
Repayment of
preference shares/loans
Sales to management
(buy-back)
Other
Write offs
  
26
2.5.1 Secondary Sales 
Secondary sales involves keeping the portfolio company privately held, either through 
allocating to another private equity fund or through a trade sale, often performed in 
cooperation with large industrial actors pursuing attractive targets that are able to provide 
synergies.  
To Another Active Fund 
These transactions involves sales to other private equity-funds with the goal of further 
development. The empirical evidence on the relationship between private equity-fund 
sponsorship and market sentiment exploitation is ambiguous. However, as a general trend, 
these transactions occur most frequently during market downturns, as public equities often 
exhibit poor performance.   
To Financial Institutions 
Sales to financial institutions, other than private equity-firms, most often pension funds, 
endowments, foundations, banks, insurance companies and various professional asset 
managers.  
To Industrial  Establishments (Trade Sales) 
The most common exit in both the U.S. and in Europe, entailing a process of share transfers, 
most often to strategic buyers pursuing inorganic9 growth strategies and synergies with 
existing operations. Trade sales represent the most frequently applied exit route also in 
Norway, as illustrated in Figure 1.12.  
2.5.2 Liquidation  
Liquidation, or write-offs, is the worst-case scenario, involving a full or partial deterioration 
of the initial investment. Write-offs experienced a heavy increase in 2012, coinciding with the 
abrupt decrease in allocation of capital to the fund level, displayed in Figure 1.9. 
                                                 
9 Inorganic growth originates from mergers and acquisitions, take-overs, foreign exchange movements etc., as opposed to 
organic growth, which involves business expansion by increasing the overall customer base, output per customer or sales 
applying assets already in place.    
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2.5.3 Repurchase by Founders (Buy-Backs) 
Private equity-funds may sell their equity stake back to the founders of the company, 
dependent on their ability to attain sufficient financial support from external financial 
intermediaries. This process is almost identical to a regular management buyout (MBO), 
besides that management now has received external business plan revisions prior to the take-
over, potentially improving operations in the future. The founders are able to facilitate transfer 
of ownership using an investment vehicle consisting of their initial stake and a shell company 
with a liability attached to it, ultimately secured by the target company’s assets. This way, they 
are still able to mitigate agency conflicts through concentrated ownership and aligned 
incentives, in the same manner as through PE/VC-involvement. This form of exit has occurred 
relatively frequently in Norway during recent years. It might represent a feasible exit route 
during poor equity market conditions, where IPOs offer poor returns for both the management 
fund and the entrepreneurs, and where alternative buyers are scarce. The market has 
experienced two crises during our sample period, which helps explain the rising popularity of 
this particular exit.  
2.5.4 Share Sales (IPOs) 
Share sales through IPOs often, in general, coincide with favorable market conditions, 
demonstrated by most studies previously engaged with the subject of “hot issue” markets10. 
Whether or not PE-funds exploit market sentiment to the same extent as non-sponsored IPOs 
remains an open question, as the existing evidence leaves an ambiguous impression. We will 
look into this subject ahead.  
Commonly sighted motivations for IPOs are; increased liquidity, diversification, M&A-
currency11 and more easily accessible capital. Still, there are several disadvantages of going 
public, like dispersion of ownership, poorer management monitoring, misalignment of 
incentives between management and shareholders,  high costs (both directly and indirectly), 
                                                 
10 “Hot issue” markets refers to observations of a positive relationship between IPO volume and favorable market conditions 
in the form of high valuation multiples and overvalues equities.  
11 Obtaining a noted stock price enables the company to pay with/exchange shares when performing mergers and/or 
acquisitions. 
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and also increased transparency (unattractive from a competitive point of view) and costly 
regulatory requirements, rendering the motivation behind the decision of going public 
somewhat unclear. These issues, which we discuss in depth in section 2.2, gives rise to several 
IPO puzzles, which we elaborate on in section 2.3. The next section thoroughly explains the 
IPO process, IPO puzzles and the mutual relationship between the involved parties.  
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3. Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) 
“The process of selling stock to the public for the very first time is called an initial public 
offering (IPO)”. 
Berk and DeMarzo (2011)  
This statement neatly defines IPOs, but in order to obtain an understanding of factors driving 
the decision to go public, and also the processes surrounding the preliminary workings and 
post IPO precedures, we have to widen our theoretical framework. Below, we have cited a 
timeline created by Deloitte, illustrating the typical progress of a Norwegian IPO, pre offering.  
3.1 The Mechanics of IPOs in a Norwegian Perspective   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1) Application Process 
Deloitte, "IPOs – The road towards the stock exchange and company requirements post flotation” 
Through this section, we will focus on information relevant for the Norwegian IPO market, 
supplemented with input from international studies. Our review closely follows that of 
Deloitte’s comprehensive examination of the Norwegian IPO process. We elaborate on Figure 
2.1 under section 2.1.3, but prior to this, some information on the differences between the two 
largest authorized Norwegian market places follows, as the requirements for listing differs.   
days 
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3.1.1 Authorized Norwegian Market Places 
Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE), founded in 1819 in Christiania, historically focused on 
commodities and foreign exchange before entering securities trading during the latter part of 
the 19th century. Today, the exchange splits into OSE, Oslo ABM and Oslo Axess. We dismiss 
Oslo ABM, as it is a market for bonds and certificates, while we describe OSE and Oslo Axess 
below. Both are subject to an overrepresentation of companies engaged in energy, shipping 
and seafood.   
Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) 
OSE (2013) states that the energy sector constitute around half of the market values listed, the 
market for shipping stocks is the largest in Europe (2nd in the world) and the seafood sector is 
also world leading. There are 167 companies listed on OSE, and the aggregated market 
capitalization of all companies were NOK 1392 billion by the end of 2012. Around 80 percent 
were distributed among the top 10 companies, illustrated in the graph below. Statoil, Yara 
International, Norsk Hydro, Orkla, Aker Solutions, Marine Harvest and Aker comprises 50 % 
of the total market value of all companies listed on OSE, reflecting the high concentration of 
energy and commodities. 
Figure 2.2) Distribution of Market Capitalization on OSE (31.12.12) 
Oslo Stock Exchange 
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Concerning the distribution of IPOs across sectors, both on the OSE and Oslo Axess, Figure 
2.3 illustrates a composition tilted towards energy, traditional industry and IT/telecom. 
Additionally, IT/Telecom and shipping displays display fewer, while larger IPOs, than many 
of the remaining sectors. 
 
Figure 2.3) IPOs; Sector Composition (1996-2010) 
Oslo Stock Exchange 
Oslo Axess 
OSE fully complies with EU-regulations, while Oslo Axess is a less stringent market place, 
accessible for companies of a smaller size and shorter history. Oslo Axess was initiated in 
2007. We have listed Terms for Quotation found at OSE’s home pages below.  
       OSE   Oslo Axess 
- Dispersion (Share of public equity dispersed  25 %   25 % 
amongst public stakeholders) 
- Number of stock holders that each must own  500   100 
over NOK 10.000 of stock 
- Minimum market value (mill NOK)   300   8 
- Positive EBITDA the last three years?   No   No 
- History and operations    Three active years One yearly- or interim 
       Exemptible  report, operations plan 
- Pre commercial companies   Cannot list  Suitability evaluation 
       Exemptible  
- Price floor per stock    NOK 10   NOK 1 
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The accumulated market capitalization’s ratio of the top ten firms listed on Oslo Axess is 
approximately the same as on OSE, 79 %, but more evenly distributed, as Statoil ASA weighs 
heavily on OSE. There are 33 companies listed on Oslo Axess by December 2013. 
 
Figure 2.4) Distribution of Market Capitalization on Oslo Axess (31.12.12) 
Oslo Stock Exchange 
3.1.2 Evaluations Prior to an IPO 
Through an IPO, companies achieve liquidity, diversification and access to capital through 
seasoned issues. Even so, there are several disadvantages of an IPO, elaborated under section 
2.2.4-2.2.6. Firms need to evaluate market timing, company maturity, growth prospects, 
regulatory requirements, reporting standards, needs for capacity and internal expertise. 
Usually, companies start the preliminary work one or two years prior to the offering. 
3.1.3 Application Process 
The section refers to Figure 2.1, which indicate the extent and order of preliminary workings 
prior to the offering. The stylized timeframe is purely for illustrative purposes, as some IPOs 
are substantially more time-consuming.  
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Statement and OSE Meeting Before Application Processing 
Prior to delivering an application, the firm’s management and the board of directors of OSE 
hold a preliminary meeting, clarifying the following conditions: 
1) Business concept and planned operations 
2) Management and administrative board 
3) The firm’s economic situation 
4) Accounts and accounting principles, and also competence within financial reporting 
5) Available resources for handling reporting- and informational requirements post IPO 
6) If possible, any capital increases and distribution sales expected to be completed 
7) Potentially planned stabilization and needs for admission requirements exemptions 
8) Information and stock holder policies 
9) If an alternative application for notation at Oslo Axess is of interest  
No later than five days prior to the meeting, OSE demand a written statement of whether or 
how the conditions for admission are/will be fulfilled.  
Preliminary Meeting, Application and Processing 
The management precede the IPO application by attending an introductory meeting arranged 
by the OSE, where the firm’s management is informed about the obligations that follows a 
public listing. The company must use a standard form of application, supplied by the OSE, 
and signed by the firm’s board of directors. 
Prospectus 
The main purpose of the prospectus is to describe the relevant aspects of the issuer company, 
to enable current and future investors in making informed assessments of their demand. The 
regulatory framework surrounding IPO prospects are meant to enhance capital market 
efficiency through increased confidence and greater harmonization with the EU. 
Fast Track-Listing 
For companies that want a faster and/or more custom listing process than described above, the 
OSE introduced with effect from first of July 2012 a compressed process, “fast track-listing”. 
In optimal situations, this means that the processing time can be reduced down to four weeks, 
at an introductory fee equal to three times the normal fee. 
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Quotation 
The company is admitted to listing after the OSE Board’s decision is published and all 
conditions are met. The President and CEO then makes decisions about which day the stock 
will be listed.  
3.1.4 Financial Reporting 
Listed companies are normally required to prepare consolidated financial statements and 
interim financial statements in accordance with IFRS, as adopted by the EU. In addition, the 
Norwegian Accounting Act sets some specific requirements beyond IFRS requirements, 
typically information on executive compensation, options and the like.  
The effects and extent of the restatement to IFRS will depend on the industry and the 
complexity of the individual company. In addition to the direct effects of the external 
reporting, the transition to IFRS could also affect the internal procedures and processes, such 
as budgeting and internal reporting and monitoring. It is also a requirement that listed 
companies must submit interim reports for each quarter during the year, specified and 
presented in accordance with the requirements of IFRS. 
3.1.5 Disclosure Requirements 
Listed companies are placed under the Securities Trading Act, adopted by the OSE, and 
subject to a number of requirements, particularly in relation to transparency and information. 
The requirements are essentially the same whether the listing takes place on OSE or Oslo 
Axess, and involves the following issues:  
1) Transparency, ensuring that all participants have access to information 
simultaneously.  
2) Insider Information regulations ensures that no one are able to profit from publicly 
undisclosed information.   
3) Profit Warnings is to be published when there is reason to expect a result that is 
significantly different from what has previously been announced.   
4) Changes in Capital, Dividends, Mergers and Demergers are all transactions that shall 
immediately be made public by the firm.  
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5) Agreements with closely related parties, like companies in the same concern, are 
required to be disclosed immediately.   
6) Agreements involving larger acquirements or disposals are subject to expanded 
disclosure requirements, when exceeding certain thresholds.  
7) Changes to the Board and of auditor should be published immediately.   
8) General Meetings are required announced 21 days prior to date the meeting takes 
place, both by mail and through at least one national newspaper.  
3.1.6 Underwriters 
Underwriters of an IPO aids the companies that hire them in marketing the issue, performing 
valuations, filing necessary reports and allocating shares. Often, this process calls for a 
syndicate of underwriters, where the lead underwriter offers the lion’s share of advice and 
others assist with marketing and sales related issues. 
Underwriters’ services provided during an IPO also includes a market-making role, 
guaranteeing that the stock remains liquid during the initial stages of the offering.  Often, the 
underwriters also guarantees for the whole issue at a given price, and hence; acts as an insurer, 
a service often referred to as “the underwriters put”. Greenshoe provisions (over-allotments) 
limits the underwriters downside potential, while simultaneously facilitate an immediate liquid 
market for the issuing companies’ stock. The Greenshoe provision enables the underwriter to 
issue additional stock at the original offer price, limited to a fixed share of the initial issue, 
often 15 %. Both the initial issue plus the Greenshoe provision are put up for sale, enabling 
the underwriters to cover their short position if the issue is successful, or turn around and 
support the stock price through supporting purchases, if the issue fails. 
Valuation 
There are primarily two ways of performing a valuation of a non-listed company; 1) 
discounted cash flow-analysis (DCF) or 2) using comparable industry peers or recent 
representative IPOs. Often, underwriters employ both methods to arrive at a reasonable price 
range, in close collaboration with the issuing firm. Both methods are flawed, and none of them 
account for generally overpriced industries. Especially the DCF method is sensitive to overly 
optimistic estimates of industry growth rates, as this will have a large impact on the terminal 
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value for the last forecasted year. When the initial price range is set, the underwriter prepares 
a road show and a book building process, detailed below. 
Book Building 
Prior to the book building process, the underwriters often performs a road trip in cooperation 
with senior management, to create publicity, pending the informal bidding process taking 
place afterwards. Subsequent to the road trip, underwriters receive share allotment orders and 
allocate according to each respective part’s willingness to pay, which in turn incentivize their 
largest investors to state their real price. Other mechanisms include auctions and fixed price 
issues, but book building is by far the most widespread method.    
Risk Management 
Auctions have yet to become widespread for IPOs, so the underwriter often enters into an 
agreement of a firm commitment, meaning that the underwriter purchase all the outstanding 
stock, adjusted for their fee, and resell it in the secondary market. This entails an exposure to 
declining stock prices, which obviously creates an ex ante incentive to underestimate the true 
value of the issuing company’s stock. This is yet another cost carried by the issuing company’s 
owners, further emphasizing the puzzles surrounding why companies willingly incur them.  
For the vast majority of IPOs, the stock price increase during the first day of trading, reducing 
the risk carried by the underwriter. Loughran and Ritter (2004) find that, between 1990 and 
1998, only 9 % of U.S. IPOs experienced a negative stock price development, 16 % ended at 
the same price, while the rest experienced positive first-day returns. These ranged from an 
average of 7 % in the 80s, 15 % in the 90s to 65 % during the dot.com-bubble years following 
the millennial change, while reverting to 12 % during 2002-2003.       
3.2 Pros and cons of performing an IPO 
Going public involves both advantages and disadvantages, some of which Berk and DeMarzo 
(2011) briefly mentions and which we will elaborate on. Textbooks within the field of 
Corporate Finance often touches on the subject, but rarely supply in-depth and nuanced 
explanations of observed practice.  
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3.2.1 Liquidity and Diversification 
Going public enables the owners to liquidate their stake and diversify their holdings, an 
attribute often perceived as a major advantage. In addition, management funds depend on well-
functioning markets that enables them to realize their investments within a set timeframe. 
Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) mentions liquidity as a motivation for going public, due 
to diminishing trading costs and a widening scope for diversification.   
3.2.2 Access to capital 
One of the main reasons for performing an IPO is to gain easy access to capital in addition to 
obtaining a market price for the company’s shares. The usual textbook doctrine postulates that 
an IPO represents a natural stage in a firm’s life cycle, often necessary to pursue further growth 
options. Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) on the other hand observe substantial deviations 
that are difficult to interpret in the light of this limited insight. They observe that large 
corporations in advanced capital markets – like UPS and Bechtel in the US – are being 
privately held. On the other hand, in Italy, companies are most commonly publicly traded. 
Using Italian companies as a benchmark, they claim the results are applicable to all of 
continental Europe due to similar ratios of equity markets to GPD and in terms of IPOs per 
capita, across countries. They find, somewhat surprisingly, that companies do not go public to 
finance growth, but rather to rebalance their accounts after periods of high investment and 
growth. Rebalancing involves bringing a portfolio that has deviated away from its target asset-
allocation back into line, by either investing in underweighted securities or realizing 
overweighed ones. This result applies for several other European economies, but contrasts 
with American data. 
On the other hand, debt financing seemed to be more readily available after the companies 
went public, as stricter disclosure requirements causes scrutiny and transparency. This will, in 
return, ensure increased competition amongst external lenders and reduce the cost of debt, 
increase supply of capital, or both, mentioned in Rajan (1992).  
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3.2.3 Dispersion of Ownership 
Greater liquidity and diversification also causes some issues concerning incentives on behalf 
of management, often distorted and misaligned by the following dispersion of ownership 
among thousands of arbitrary stockholders. As Draho (2004) points out, efficient corporate 
governance is often of second-order importance in an IPO decision, while the need for external 
capital often provides the initial impetus.  
Nonetheless, acknowledged articles debating over the issue of whether PE/VC contribute with 
added value, compared to non-backed (NB) companies, argues that concentrated ownership 
by PE/VC-funds post IPO drives observed abnormal returns. Megginson and Weiss (1991) 
highlights this from a VC perspective, while Cao and Lerner (2009) exert a similar view for 
LBO-exits, an operation most often performed by PE-funds. They find that both mean and 
median retained shares amounted to 40 percent immediately subsequent to the flotation, 
among 526 LBO-exits between 1981 and 2003.  
 
The fact that PE- and VC-funds also employ top-tier national investment- and commercial 
bankers on the board of directors of the issuing company might alleviate informational 
asymmetries and provide access to capital, as highlighted in Brav and Gompers (1997). 
Representatives from the funds also hold board positions subsequent to the IPO, exerting 
active management. Barry et al. (1990) find for American data, that VC funds hold on average 
34 % of the board seats post IPO, and this share remains stable one year forward.  
3.2.4 Stock Market Monitoring vs. Private Monitoring 
With dispersed ownership, there is a trade of private monitoring for public monitoring. This 
is an apparent disadvantage, as shareholders incentives rarely align with those of management, 
giving rise to agency conflicts. Active management funds engage in active ownership post 
IPO, and often gear up the company, effectively tightening the operational leeway for 
corporate perquisites and negative NPV projects. In addition, PE-funds often combine equity 
with debt to provide an additional layer of monitoring. The method is hypothesized and proven 
effective, as shown in the two-periodic model of Axelson, Strömberg and Weisback (2009). 
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3.2.5 Transparency and Regulatory Requirements 
Under section 2.1.4 and 2.1.5, we listed some of the most pronounced regulatory requirements 
surrounding companies’ activities post IPO, both of informational and financial character. 
These requirements are often costly, while simultaneously imposing a competitive 
disadvantage on listed firms. When being forced to disclose any important information that 
might alter the future prospects of the firms’ value, discretion surrounding major impact 
decisions, is difficult to obtain.   
3.3 IPO Puzzles 
When academics address IPO puzzles, the underwriters’- and issuing companies’ incentives 
often lies at the core of the debate. Underpricing, long-run underperformance and cyclicality 
of IPOs are all subject to some anomalies that we will address in detail. These puzzles are 
interrelated and often studied in connection with one another. We have made an effort at 
illustrating these connections in a coherent manner. 
 
Figure 2.5) Interrelations Between IPO Puzzles 
Oslo Stock Exchange 
The interrelation between underpricing, cyclicality (of both initial returns and IPO volume) 
and long-run underperformance is hypothesized in Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1994) in the 
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following sense: periodic over-optimism on the part of investors leads to “windows of 
opportunity”; periods where firms and investors collectively approach the public market place 
in pursuit of abnormal returns. When the companies fail to fulfil these expectations, usually 
after revised earnings estimates, the resulting long-run performance often disappoints. This 
connects cyclicality and long-run performance. Underpricing often associates with 
asymmetric information between the issuing company, the underwriter (e.g. investments 
banks) and investors. If the underwriter price the offering too high, investors will shun future 
issues, while issuers will approach competitors if the price is set too low. We pursue several 
hypotheses explaining why market participants allow this market anomaly to persist, in the 
following subsections. With a brief description of each puzzle and their interrelations in mind, 
we approach an in-depth description of each one below.  
3.3.1 Empirical Results on Underpricing 
Underpricing refers to the incident of high initial returns on the first days of public trading, 
and is often measured as the difference between the offering price set by the underwriter and 
the price at the end of the first day of trading. Underpricing of new equity issues is a well-
known phenomenon, generally occurring across firms of different characteristics, across 
industries and countries. Below, we have reproduced two tables illustrating the results of 
international and national studies investigating the phenomenon of underpricing.  
 
 
Country   Source  Sample 
Size
Time Period Avg, 
Initial 
Return 
Argentina Eijgenhuijsen & van der Valk 20 1991-1994 4,4 %
Australia Lee, Taylor & Walter; Woo; Pham; Ritter 1,103 1976-2006 19,8 %
Austria Aussenegg 96 1971-2006 6,5 %
Belgium Rogiers, Manigart & Ooghe; Manigart, DuMortier; Ritter 114 1984-2006 13,5 %
Brazil Aggarwal, Leal & Hernandez; Saito 180 1979-2006 48,7 %
Bulgaria Nikolov 9 2004-2007 36,5 %
Canada Jog & Riding; Jog & Srivastava; Kryzanowski, Lazrak & 
Rakita; Ritter
635 1971-2006 7,1 %
Chile Aggarwal, Leal & Hernandez; Celis & Maturana; Ritter 65 1982-2006 8,4 %
China Chen, Choi, and Jiang (A shares) 1,394 1990-2005 164,5 %
Cyprus Gounopoulos, Nounis, and Stylianides 51 1999-2002 23,7 %
Denmark Jakobsen & Sorensen; Ritter 145 1984-2006 8,1 %
Finland Keloharju 162 1971-2006 17,2 %
France Husson & Jacquillat; Leleux & Muzyka; Paliard & 
Belletante; Derrien & Womack; Chahine; Ritter
686 1983-2006 10,7 %
Germany  Ljungqvist; Rocholl: Ritter                            652 1978-2006          26,9 %
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Table 2.1) International Studies on Underpricing: Equally Weighted Average Initial Returns 
for 45 Countries 
Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (2008) 
International studies report underpricing-levels ranging from 4.2% (Russia) to 164.5% (China) 
for overlapping periods. Although underpricing is highly cyclical, we can report that the 
average underpricing across countries and periods is 27.1% with a standard deviation of 
approximately similar magnitude, 27.4%, in other words, quite high. 
Greece Nounis, Kazantzis & Thomas                        363 1976-2005          25,1 %
Hong Kong McGuinness; Zhao & Wu; Ljungqvist & Yu; Fung, Gul, 
and Radhakrishnan; Ritter
1008 1980-2006          15,9 %
India Marisetty and Subrahmanyam                    2811 1990-2007          92,7 %
Indonesia Hanafi; Ljungqvist & Yu; Danny; Suherman 321 1989-2007          21,1 %
Iran Bagherzadeh  279 1991-2004          22,4 %
Ireland Ritter 31 1999-2006          23,7 %
Israel Kandel, Sarig & Wohl; Amihud & Hauser; Ritter 348 1990-2006          13,8 %
Italy Arosio, Giudici & Paleari; Cassia, Paleari & Redondi; 
Vismara                            
233 1985-2006          18,2 %
Japan Fukuda; Dawson & Hiraki; Hebner & Hiraki; Pettway & 
Kaneko; Hamao, Packer, & Ritter; Kaneko & Pettway; 
Ritter; TokyoIPO,com         
2579 1970-2007          40,5 %
Korea Dhatt, Kim & Lim; Ihm; Choi & Heo; Ng; Cho; Ritter        1417 1980-2007          57,4 %
Malaysia Isa; Isa & Yong; Yong                                   350 1980-2006          69,6 %
Mexico Aggarwal, Leal & Hernandez; Eijgenhuijsen & van der 
Valk                        
88 1987-1994          15,9 %
Netherlands Wessels; Eijgenhuijsen & Buijs; Jenkinson, Ljungqvist, & 
Wilhelm; Ritter                   
181 1982-2006          10,2 %
New Zealand Vos & Cheung; Camp & Munro; Ritter 214 1979-2006 20,3 %
Nigeria Ikoku; Achua 114 1989-2006 12,7 %
Norway Emilsen, Pedersen & Saettem; Liden; Ritter 153 1984-2006 9,6 %
Philippines Sullivan & Unite; Ritter 123 1987-2006 21,2 %
Poland Jelic & Briston; Ritter 224 1991-2006 22,9 %
Portugal Almeida & Duque; Ritter 28 1992-2006 11,6 %
Russia Ritter 40 1999-2006 4,2 %
Singapore Lee, Taylor & Walter; Dawson; Ritter 441 1973-2006 28,3 %
South Africa Page & Reyneke 118 1980-1991 32,7 %
Spain Ansotegui & Fabregat; Alvarez Otera 128 1986-2006 10,9 %
Sri Lanka Samarakoon 115 1987-2007 48,9 %
Sweden Rydqvist; Schuster; Simonov; Ritter 406 1980-2006 27,3 %
Switzerland Kunz,Drobetz, Kammermann & Walchli; Ritter 147 1983-2006 29,3 %
Taiwan Chen 1,312 1980-2006 37,2 %
Thailand Wethyavivorn & Koo-smith; Lonkani & Tirapat; 
Ekkayokkaya and Pengniti
459 1987-2007 36,6 %
Turkey Kiymaz; Durukan; Ince 282 1990-2004 10,8 %
United Kingdom Dimson; Levis 3,986 1959-2006 16,8 %
United States             Ibbotson, Sindelar & Ritter; Ritter            12,007 1960-2007          16,9 %
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Table 2.2) National Studies on Underpricing 
Moe (2007)  
NB) We have extended Moe’s table with additional studies, displayed in italics. 
The average level for national (Norwegian) studies, including the one covering the short and 
abnormal period of the dot.com-bubble, amounts to 13.14% with a standard deviation of 
10.83%. The median value of the national sample resembles the mean (13.44%), while the 
median value of the international sample (20.3%) indicate more extreme values. Almost all 
studies find positive levels of underpricing, demonstrated by the widespread and recurring 
presence of abnormal initial returns following shortly after the IPO. However, nationally 
documented underpricing seems to have declined somewhat in recent times, from double- to 
single digit returns.  
This evidence of recurring underpricing is inconsistent with market efficiency, which is the 
main reason why it has been the topic of several reputable articles from leading academics. 
Author Period Method Initial Return
Ruud and Ullevoldsæter (1987) 1982 - 1986 CAPM, market adjusted 14,80 %
Market adjusted model, without beta 14,60 %
Market adjusted model, with beta 18,20 %
Nærland (1994) 1984 - 1994 CAR 12,03 %
Håland (1994) 1982 - 1994 CAPM 19,30 %
Market adjusted model 18,20 %
Sættern (1996) 1982 - 1996 Market adjusted model 13,46 %
Emilsen and Pedersen (1996) 1982 - 1996 CAPM 17,40 %
Market adjusted model 12,74 %
Gabrielsen et.al (2001) 1982 - 1999 Market adjusted model 16,70 %
Ardø (2001) 1990 - 2003 CAR 12,90 %
Emilsen and Enger (2003) 1982 - 2002 Market adjusted model 18,50 %
1999 - 2000 Market adjusted model 50,80 %
Edvardsen (2004) 1997 - 2004 Unadjusted returns 11,25 %
Kyllo and Skaar (2006) 1985 - 2005 Market adjusted model 13,44 %
Samuelsen and Tveter (2006) 2004 - 2005 Market adjusted model 2,21 %
Kalstad (2007) 2003 - 2006 Unadjusted returns 3,35 %
Hjesdal (2007) 2004 - 2006 Unadjusted returns 3,15 %
Grønberg (2011) 2004 - 2005 Unadjusted returns -1,11 %
Ellingsen (2012) 2006 - 2011 Market adjusted model 2,41 %
Moen and Hewage (2012) 2000 - 2011 Market adjusted model 1,55 %
*CAR: Cumulative Abnormal Return
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Levels of underpricing are unevenly distributed across firms. Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter 
(1994) find that smaller issues, on average, are underpriced by more than larger issues. The 
authors then represent several explanations for why underpricing is widespread across 
countries and persists through time: 
1) The Winner’s Curse: Due to informational asymmetry, some investors will be worse off 
than others. Those with superior knowledge only demand shares in underpriced issues of good 
quality, while those without this knowledge will demand shares in every issue, while only 
receiving a fraction of the good issues but all of the bad issues. Faced with this adverse 
selection problem, the uninformed investors will demand a sufficient level of underpricing to 
compensate them for the selection bias imposed on them.  
2) Dynamic Information Acquisition: In an attempt from investments bankers in revealing 
information during the pre-selling period, they subsidize those willing to help them price the 
issue, in the form of underpricing.  
3) Information Cascades: Investors do not only act according to their own private information, 
but also manage to observe others’ information, and revise their behaviour accordingly. This 
effect runs both ways, causing the underwriter to underprice the issue initially to attract some 
investors, which will induce others to follow.  
4) Reducing Legal Liabilities: Underpricing might occur as a precautionary action, as 
underwriters want to avoid legal actions from investors following the IPO. The evidence is 
mixed, and the authors suggests that legal liability considerations are at most a minor reason 
for the underpricing of IPOs.  
5) Enhancing Banker Relations with Investors: This hypothesis is one of the most widely 
acknowledged, but consists of several nuanced theories. One of the most recognized states that 
investment bankers take advantage of the informational asymmetry between themselves and 
the issuing firm, regarding market dynamics, securing future business with their investors on 
the buy-side.  
6) Regulatory Constraints: Some countries practice regulatory requirements based on firms’ 
book values. This is mentioned also in the next section related to Korea’s high post IPO 
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performance, due to price adjustments of the issue. This effect is most pronounced for small 
growth firms, with low book values, which may ultimately lead to excessive underpricing.  
3.3.2 Empirical Results on Long-Run Performance 
Poor long-run performance of IPOs is another market anomaly of IPOs and a natural extension 
of underpricing. Jay R. Ritter and Tim Loughran have conducted, by far, the most 
comprehensive studies on the subject, in their seminal papers: Ritter (1991), Loughran (1993), 
Loughran and Ritter (1995). 
In Ritter (1991), a sample of 1,526 IPOs going public in the U.S. in the 1975-84 period, 
significantly underperform comparable firms matched by size and industry, three years 
subsequent to the offering. Ritter states the data patterns are consistent with an IPO market in 
which investors are periodically overoptimistic about the earnings potential of young growth 
firms and the simultaneous exploitation of sentiment by these firms. The pattern of 
underperformance concentrates among relatively young growth companies, in particular those 
going public in high-volume years.  
Loughran (1993), building on Ritter’s (1991) results, also document a long-run 
underperformance when applying a sample of 3,656 IPOs in the 1967-1987 period, using a 
six-calendar-year aftermarket period, measured relative to an equally-weighted NASDAQ 
index. Loughran finds an average six-year holding period return (HPR) of 17.29% for IPOs, 
compared with a similar HPR of 76.23% for the NASDAQ index, effectively measuring a 
wealth relative12 of 0.666, which is smaller than Ritter’s reported wealth relative of 0.831.   
Both authors later write a joint paper on the same subject in Loughran and Ritter (1995), 
including the performance of SEOs, which is the main contribution from their previous work. 
Using a sample of 4,753 companies going public in the U.S. during 1970 to 1990, the authors 
find poor long-run returns for both investment types, arguing that investors would have had to 
invest 44 percent more in the issuing firms than in the non-issuing firms to achieve the same 
                                                 
12 The “wealth relative” is calculated as: Ʃ (1 + Ri,T) / Ʃ (1 + Rbench,T), where Ri,T is the buy and hold return on IPO i for period 
T and Rbench,T is the buy and hold return on the benchmark portfolio over the same period. 
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wealth effect five years after the offering. The table reproduced below illustrates partially 
consistent results across international studies.  
 
Table 2.313) International Studies on Long-Run Performance 
Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) 
The authors hypothesize several reasons for the persistence of long-run underperformance, 
where investor over-optimism and overvalued firms exploiting “windows of opportunities” 
are central.   
                                                 
13 Returns are calculated annually, with the exception of McGuinness (1993), Stigler (1964) and Keloharju (1993) who states 
accumulated returns. Returns are benchmark adjusted, but not risk adjusted; assuming all betas equal 1. Initial returns are not 
included and the methodological approach to calculating return varies (Broks og Båtstrand, 2008) 
Country Author Period # Companies # Years Return
Australia Lee et al. (1996) 1976-1989 266 3 -51,0 %
Brasil Aggarw al et al. (1993) 1980-1990 62 3 -47,0 %
Canada Shaw (1971) 1956-1963 105 5 -32,3 %
Chile Aggarw al et al. (1993) 1982-1990 28 3 -23,7 %
Finland Keloharju (1993) 1984-1989 79 3 -21,1 %
Hong Kong McGuinness (1993) 1980-1990 72 2 -18,3 %
Italia Giudici & Paleari (1999) 1985-1995 84 3 -2,6 %
Japan Cai & Wei (1997) 1971-1992 180 5 -26,0 %
Korea Kim et al. (1995) 1985-1988 99 3 91,6 %
Malaysia Paudyal et al. (1998) 1984-1994 62 3 9,0 %
New Zealand Firth (1997) 1979-1987 143 5 -17,9 %
Singapore Lee et al. (1996) 1973-1992 132 3 0,8 %
Storbritannia Levis (1993) 1980-1988 712 3 -8,1 %
Sverige Loughran et al. (1994) 1980-1990 162 3 1,2 %
Sveits Kunz & Aggarw al (1994) 1983-1989 34 3 -6,1 %
Tyrkia Kiymaz (1998) 1990-1995 138 3 44,1 %
Tyskland Sclag & Wodrich (2000) 1884-1914 163 5 -7,8 %
Tyskland Ljungqvist (1997) 1970-1990 145 3 -12,1 %
USA Stigler (1964) 1923-1928 70 5 -37,7 %
USA Simon (1989) 1926-1933 35 5 -39,0 %
USA Simon (1989) 1934-1940 20 5 6,2 %
USA Stigler (1964) 1949-1955 46 5 -25,1 %
USA Cusatis et al. (1993) 1965-1988 146 3 33,6 %
USA Loughran (1993) 1967-1987 3656 6 -33,3 %
USA Loughran & Ritter (1995) 1970-1990 4753 5 -30,0 %
USA Ritter (1991) 1975-1984 1526 3 -29,1 %
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On the other hand, as depicted in the table above, six studies find positive long-run returns, 
ranging from 0.8% to 91.6%. The upper bound concerns Korea, and Jenkinson and Ljungqvist 
(2001) argue that some of the abnormal return can be attributed regulatory requirements, above 
all; price adjustments of issues.  
Nonetheless, this is consistent with Brav and Gompers (1997), where underperformance of 
IPOs is apparent on an equal-weighted basis, but almost disappears when value weighting the 
returns. They argue that underperformance is not an IPO effect, as similar size and book-to-
market firms that have not issued equity perform as poorly as IPOs. Their hypotheses explains 
why this anomaly persists, and closely resemble those asserted in Ritter and Loughran’s 
papers. Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1994) suggest the following reasons:  
1) Excessive Optimism: Optimistic investors will, on average, receive the highest allocation of 
shares, as their valuations will be over-optimistic and their bid priced accordingly. Subsequent 
to the offering, they will revise their earnings estimates until their expectations narrows 
towards the pessimistic estimates, and eventually align with realistic ones. This causes the 
market price to drop, gradually approaching the fundamental value of the firm.  
2) Impresarios: The investment bank underwriting the issue fulfils a role as an advocate for 
the company, intentionally underpricing it to create the appearance of excess demand. This in 
turn induces long-run underperformance among the IPOs with the highest initial returns.  
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Table 2.414) National Studies on Long-Run Performance 
Kyllo and Skar (2006) 
NB) We have extended Kyllo and Skaar’s (2006) table with an additional study, displayed in italics. 
National (Norwegian) studies on long-run performance document a narrower range than 
international studies. 10 out of 14 find negative benchmark-adjusted returns, with an average 
of -9,0 % (median -14,4 %) and a standard deviation of 13,3 %. Varying sample periods, 
sample sizes and methodologies impairs generalization, and assuming full market exposure (β 
= 1) might return misleading risk-adjusted returns. 
3.3.3 Empirical Results on Cyclicality and “Hot Issue” Markets 
The phenomenon of IPO cyclicality has also been the topic of intense research, where the 
existing evidence points towards a mutual connection between initial returns, mentioned in 
2.3.1 and cyclicality of IPO volume. Both factors show a tendency to correlate positively with 
the overall market conditions, as illustrated in Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1994).  “Hot 
issue” markets refers to incidents when initial returns surge above the public offer price shortly 
after the listing. Reasons for these phenomena usually centres around three hypotheses:  
                                                 
14 Returns are calculated annually and accumulated. Returns are benchmark adjusted, but not risk adjusted; assuming all betas 
equal 1. Initial returns are not included and the methodological approach to calculating return varies (Broks og Båtstrand, 
2008) 
Author Period # Companies # Years Return
Håland (1994) 1982 - 1991 59 3 -17,80 %
Nærland (1994) 1984 - 1994 131 3 -25,20 %
Emilsen and Pedersen (1996) 1984 - 1996 58 3 -15,20 %
Sættern (1996) 1984 - 1996 99 3 11,50 %
1982 - 1996 49 3 -20,30 %
Blystad and Lorentzen 1988 - 1997 151 3 0,80 %
Gabrielsen et.al (2010) 1983 - 1999 207 3 -20,20 %
1983 - 1999 81 3 -14,20 %
1983 - 1999 207 3 -14,50 %
Emilsen and Enger (2003) 1983 - 2000 169 3 15,40 %
Edvardsen (2004) 1997 - 2004 46 3 9,20 %
Ingebritsen (2004) 1996 - 2000 109 3 -4,60 %
1996 - 2000 87 3 -9,00 %
Moen and Hewage (2012) 2000 - 2008 99 3 -21,70 %
  
48
1) Changes in Firm Risk: there are some evidence of risker issues being more heavily 
underpriced than less risky issues, implying that risk explain periods of fluctuating initial 
returns. High initial returns also positively correlates with IPO volume, implying that differing 
risk characteristics drive both swings in IPO volume and hot issues. While the evidence 
explains some of the volume- and returns cyclicality, there remains a substantial part still 
unaccounted for by differences in issuers’ risk characteristics.   
2) Positive Feedback or “Momentum” Strategies: Investors following a “positive feedback” 
strategy that might cause positive autocorrelation in IPO returns, leading prices to drift 
upwards, and setting in motion a self-fulfilling prophecy. Lowry and Schwert (2002) also find 
that both IPO volume and average initial returns are highly autocorrelated. They lend support 
to Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter by claiming that both the cycles in returns and the lead-lag 
relation between initial returns and IPO volume are driven by information learned through the 
registration period. In other words, more positive information results in higher initial returns 
and more firms subsequently filing for registration soon after.  
3) Windows of Opportunity: There are periods when IPOs sell at abnormally high multiples, 
price to earnings, market to book value, or other measures of value, that often coincide with 
high IPO volume. This pattern is apparent in Figure 2.6 below, illustrating the development of 
IPO volume and market capitalization of new and existing listings for the Norwegian market 
over the period 1996 – 2012. In Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1994), the authors argues that 
this might induce underwriters and issuers to accept higher underpricing, illustrating the 
mutual connection between the variables illustrated in Figure 2.5. If firms are timing market 
sentiment, they are taking advantage of the asymmetrical information between themselves and 
investors, what the authors has coined “exploiting windows of opportunity”.  
Below, we have graphed the cyclicality of Norwegian IPOs, where the number of IPOs is 
represented by the orange line, while we illustrate the total market capitalization and the 
market capitalization of new listings (in billion NOK) by dark and light blue bars, respectively.  
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Market Capitalization of New Listings 
 
Figure 2.6) Cyclicality of Norwegian IPOs 
World Federation of Exchanges and Oslo Stock Exchange 
The data exhibits several properties consistent with the theories. IPO volume declines heavily 
from 1997 to 1999, but quickly doubles during 2000. Subsequent to the dot.com-bubble crash 
of 2000/2001, IPO volume declined dramatically. Even though the volume declines 
dramatically from 1997 to 1999, the market capitalization of new listing increases by a factor 
of 7.3, supporting the theory of market sentiment, recognized in the aftermath of the bust.  
International studies document similar results; Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) report that IPOs 
issued in the high-volume years of 1985 and 1986 supplied negative market adjusted-returns, 
using a NASDAQ index as the benchmark, during their first year of trading. Ritter (1991) 
hypothesize a form of over-optimism on the part of investors of the prospects of young growth 
firms, which in turn induces the same firms to take advantage of these “windows of 
opportunity” also referred to as “hot issue market” phenomenon, documented in Ibbotson and 
Jaffe and Ibbotson (1975), Ritter (1984) and Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1988). Lerner 
(1994) tracks financing of the biotechnology industry in the U.S. during the 1978-1992 period, 
finding that IPO activity is highly related to the inflation-adjusted price paid for the issue, 
which implies that issues are taking advantage of “windows of opportunity”.  Loughran, Ritter, 
and Rydqvist (1994) document a positive correlation between the annual volume of IPOs and 
stock market levels, in 14 of 15 countries, during the last 20 to 30 years prior to their studies.  
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3.4 Comparing IPOs: PE/VC-IPOs versus NB-IPOs 
The theory outlined above, have so far been quite general, in the sense that we have made few 
direct comparisons between PE, VC and NB companies going public. In the following, we 
will confront the differences perceived as most pronounced by international studies, further 
narrow our focus, and then use the framework to formulate formal tests that we will apply to 
the Norwegian market. The structure outlined from 2.4.2 – 2.4.4 lays the foundation for 
statistical hypotheses testing and is reproduced under the sections further ahead in order to 
create a coherent and logical transition.  
 
Figure 2.7) IPO Comparisons 
3.4.1 Differences Between PE and VC 
In the following, we continue to address LBOs (and RLBOs15) as “PE” investments (and 
exits), seed/ventures as “VC” and non-backed as “NB”, which also includes demergers and 
divestments from industrial conglomerates. “Private equity” refers to the cohort of seed, 
ventures and leveraged buyouts, applied when we do not distinguish between PE and VC.  
Studies comparing aftermarket performance differences between PE- and VC-backed firms, 
often find distinguishing features. Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2003) find betas amounting to 
1.80 for VC-funds and 0.66 for PE-funds during their sample period. We address the issue of 
risk in section 2.4.4.  
                                                 
15 Reversed Leveraged Buyouts; refers to the exit of LBO investments. 
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Levis (2011) document contrasting IPO performance. PE-backed IPOs achieve positive and 
significant cumulative abnormal returns and operating performance during the 36 months 
following the offering, both equally- and value-weighted. VC-backed and other NB IPOs on 
the other hand, underperforms the market. Levis’ sample contains 1,595 IPOs issued on the 
LSE16 during the period of 1992 to 2005. 
We are aware of the differences between PE and VC-funds aftermarket performance. 
However, we do not distinguish our sample data between these two categories, since PE and 
VC funds often operate in a similar manner, meaning they perform both LBOs and ventures. 
Additionally, is would severely limit our data and restrict our inferential abilities. In the 
following, we mention PE and VC-studies interchangeably, highlighting both similarities and 
disparities, while simultaneously trying to generalize across the private equity asset class. 
3.4.2 Differences Between PE/VC and NB IPOs 
With the distinction of PE and VC in mind, this section aims at shedding light on the drivers 
behind the differing performance patterns between PE/VC and NB firms going public. The 
existing literature document widely differing results of PE/VC-backing on both underpricing, 
long-run performance and the underlying drivers of these differences. We summarize their 
results together with their theoretical constructs and assumptions. Based on these, we conduct 
formal statistical testing, attempting to obtain evidence for further inference. We elaborate 
briefly on some issues beyond our scope of empirical testing, in order to provide a broad 
theoretical framework for further interpretation. We refrain from extensive details on subjects 
outside the scope of this thesis.  
Below, we have constructed a figure illustrating which factors the literature highlights as 
important in driving differences in underpricing and long run-performance between PE/VC-
backed and NB IPOs. The model simultaneously reflect the structure of this section, while 
also indicating which variables we aim at measuring explicitly, characterized by an orange 
coloured square.  
                                                 
16 LSE: London Stock Exchange 
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3.4.3 Underpricing  
Figure 2.9 indicates that there is a relationship between the level of underpricing and long-run 
performance, which ceteris paribus seems evident, as one would think that higher degrees of 
underpricing should facilitate relatively higher long-run returns, as it incorporates a discount. 
On the other hand, studies document that underpricing relates to poor long-run performance, 
which means that an issue can be underpriced and overvalued at the same time, as documented 
in Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004). The interpretation mainly aligns with theories 
postulating that firms exploit market sentiment. Underpricing in general is a multifaceted 
feature, affected by continuous, cyclical and iterative processes. Below, we elaborate on these 
processes, distinguish our expectations based on PE/VC-backing, and formulate our 
hypotheses accordingly.   
Sponsoring 
“Sponsoring” refers to whether or not the firm has been assisted by a PE or VC fund, and in 
effect has received the operational, strategic and financial expertise available17. The theory of 
the winner’s curse stipulate that investors, on average, demand that IPOs must be underpriced 
so that the less informed ones will overcome their problem of adverse selection. 
The certification effect refers to the PE/VC-funds’ ability to reduce underpricing, as they 
ensure investors that the offered firm is of high quality. The results are mixed; Megginson and 
Weiss (1991), Barry et al. (1990) and Hopkins and Ross (2013) find significant reduced 
underpricing from PE involvement prior to the IPO, while Bergström, Nilsson, and Wahlberg 
(2006) argues that the certification effect is open for discussion. Franzke (2004) finds no 
support for the certification role of VC firms or prestigious underwriters when examining 160 
NB-, 70 VC- and 61 bridge-financed firms on the German Neuer Markt between 1997 and 
2002. The evidence points in the other direction, that VCs underprice issues more heavily.  
                                                 
17 We have not set any threshold level for preliminary ownership prior to the IPO, as we were unable to find these levels for 
more than 20 companies. However, given the operational structure of PE/VC funds and the purpose of their presence, in 
obtaining board positions and performing active ownership, we believe any biases to be limited. 
  
54
There are reasons for expecting both a positive and negative relationship. The former depends 
in large on the retained equity share in the IPO process, as gains from reducing underpricing 
is positively related to retention rate. Since PE/VC funds often retain a significant share, their 
incentives to reduce underpricing might not align with the issuers’ incentives. The latter is 
more flocculent, aiming at PE/V-funds’ ability to create long-term value by implementing 
management structures, operational strategies, improved monitoring and networks of suppliers 
and customers18. Bergström, Nilsson, and Wahlberg (2006) also mentions that PE/VC-funds 
reputation is at stake during an IPO exit, as they experience more publicity and scrutiny.  
A larger empirical body documents lower underpricing with PE/VC involvement, so we expect 
a reduction in underpricing. We will make this hypothesis subject to empirical testing. Our 
null hypothesis states the conservative outcome:  
H1:  PE/VC IPOs do not exhibit lower underpricing than NB IPOs. 
Market Capitalization and Risk 
Higher market capitalization is associated with lower underpricing and better long-term 
performance, partly due to issues of risk and publicity. Levis (2011) distinguish between PE 
and VC IPOs, where the former displays less underpricing than the latter, and NB IPOs. The 
author attributes this to the size and maturity of these issues, where he especially emphasize 
risk-characteristics of larger issues as a mitigating factor of underpricing. Megginson and 
Weiss (1991) on the other hand, find that VCs reduce underpricing, unrelated to market 
capitalization. We assume market capitalization has no effect on underpricing in our sample, 
but aim at testing formally. We also aim at measuring the risk surrounding PE/VC-backed 
issues, primarily for calculating risk-adjusted returns, but also for underpricing comparisons.    
H2:  Risk does not affect the level of underpricing 
H3:  Market capitalization does not explain differences in levels of underpricing 
                                                 
18 In Levis (2011), the author argues that improved efficiency and operational organization attributes value beyond the finite 
period of active ownership, performed by a PE/VC fund. We comment on this further ahead, under section 2.4.4 (Sponsoring).  
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Market Sentiment 
Market sentiment addresses the issuers’ inclination for taking advantage of overoptimistic 
investors, often measured by the degree of underpricing, as it reflect the excess demand and 
implicitly positive expectations inherent in the initial returns. 
PE/VC-funds operate with a fixed investment maturity, leaving less flexibility for timing IPOs, 
than NB companies. In addition, Bergström, Nilsson, and Wahlberg (2006) find that backed 
firms are not taken public during “hot issue” markets to the same extent as NB firms, 
suggesting they do not exploit retail investors’ sentiment as extensively. They also mention 
that institutional investors are more numerous than retail investors in PE/VC-backed IPOs. 
This mitigates herd behaviour, as institutional investors are less inclined to act irrationally, 
rather depending on information of the fundamental long-run value of companies than the 
short-term run-ups. We will supply descriptive statistics, illustrating whether or not PE/VC-
firms exhibit higher underpricing, and observe whether their issues coincides with overall “hot 
issue” markets.  
Informational Asymmetry 
Bergström, Nilsson, and Wahlberg (2006) argue that the level of informational asymmetry and 
distribution of valuable information, influence levels of underpricing. They distinguish 
between issuer, underwriter and investors. If the issuer has obtained most information, it might 
use underpricing as a signal of quality to distinguish itself from low quality firms. They argue 
that PE firms are of high quality, inducing them to underprice as a means of securing future 
seasoned issues, as their reputation is at stake when exiting through an IPO. If investors hold 
more information, the winner’s curses issue arises. If underwriters possesses most information, 
they will trade off lost future earnings from underwriting for lost future business with investors 
in deciding the level of underpricing. If the underwriter underprice too heavily, issuers will 
shy away, while investors will be reluctant to participate in future offerings if they experience 
declining initial returns.  
When distinguishing between PEs and VCs, one might expect that PEs initiating RLBOs 
reduce informational asymmetries, as they are on average larger and receive more media 
attention. VC deals are smaller in terms of size, making assumptions about the effect of the 
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relationship difficult. On average though, we would expect VCs to reduce underpricing due to 
relatively more homogenous dispersion of information among investors. We will not make 
this issue subject to testing. 
3.4.4 Long-Run Performance 
IPO long-run performance also depends on several factors, as displayed in Figure 2.9. Our 
main hypothesis attempts to identify significant and consistent differences in the long-run 
performance, dependent on whether or not the firms have received PE/VC-backing. We will 
provide a theoretical framework beyond our scope of formal testing, in an attempt to guide 
subsequent interpretation. The literature provide somewhat heterogeneous results with respect 
to the effect of backing on long-run performance. In addition, differing sample sizes, time 
horizons, markets, methodology and risk adjustments are all factors impairing generalization. 
We elaborate on the most frequently cited and widely recognized reasons for observed 
differences.  
Sponsoring 
Brav and Gompers (1997) apply a sample of 934 VC-backed IPOs from 1972 to 1992 and 
3407 NB firms from 1975 to 1992, finding that VC-backed IPOs outperform NB IPOs using 
equal-weighted returns. However, when value-weighting returns, the underperformance of NB 
IPOs decrease substantially, and the authors claim underperformance is not an IPO effect, 
arguing that long-run underperformance generally apply for small firms, regardless of equity 
issuances. Bergström, Nilsson and Wahlberg (2006) finds that PE IPOs outperform NB IPOs 
across all time horizons and weighting methods (6 months, 3 years and 5 years).  Levis (2011) 
presents evidence from analyzing PE and VC versus NB IPOs, which is consistent with 
abnormal performance of the former. His findings aligns with those of Bergström, Nilsson and 
Wahlberg (2006) in supporting the abnormal performance of PE IPOs, while finding no such 
support for VC IPOs. In general, improved operational efficiencies, closer monitoring, 
availability of management expertise and higher level of debt represents the main value drivers 
underlying the PE (LBO) model, as promoted by Jensen (1986, 1989). Levis (2011) argue that, 
even though these efficiencies seem to accrue during the period in which the firm is under PE 
control, it is also reasonable to assume that management and financial practices implemented 
during this period, continues for some time after going public. In addition, lock-up agreements 
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and retained shares in the company facilitates continued engagement, incentives alignment, 
closer monitoring, while also reducing agency conflicts and informational asymmetries. 
The studies mentioned so far have provided us with rather ambiguous results regarding 
performance differences between sponsored and non-sponsored firms. The concentration of 
ownership pre IPO has been attributed wide academic coverage, as active ownership is 
recognized as a fundamental reason for documented abnormal performance of private equity. 
Megginson and Weiss (1991) also measures the post IPO holdings of VCs in an attempt to 
unveil a lasting certification role subsequent to the offering. Their evidence indicates that VCs 
do not apply IPOs to cash out immediately; instead, they actively contribute post IPO in the 
same manner as mentioned above, ultimately realizing their investment stepwise. Bergström, 
Nilsson and Wahlberg (2006) in turn argues that this gradual reduction in ownership might 
induce shortsightedness, characterized by high initial returns, while rapidly deteriorating in 
the long run. 
Results for VC-backed firms concerning long-run performance are mixed. Those that 
incorporate both VCs and PEs find that the latter outperforms, while the former does not. 
Studies that focus solely on VCs exhibit polarized results, one documenting abnormal 
outperformance (Brav and Gompers, 1997) and others the opposite (Rindermann [2003], Levis 
[2011], and Da Silva Rosa, Velayuthen, and Walter  [2003]).  
H4:  PE/VC IPOs do not exhibit better long-run performance than NB IPOs. 
Risk 
Most studies either assume that the risk exposure for PE/VC portfolios equals that of the 
aggregate market (CAPM β = 1), use industry peers, and/or various benchmark adjustments. 
Some, on the other hand, try to adjust both segments for differences in systematic risk, for size 
and for value effects of the Fama and French 3-factor asset-pricing model. Those studies 
accounting for systematic risk exposures, all find market betas significantly different from 
one, although with widely differing values. When taking into account the operational structure 
of VC/PE funds, it seems logical that they display market betas higher than one on fund level, 
as time consuming focus on few investments leads to high levels of idiosyncratic risk. On a 
portfolio level, this is not necessarily the case as aggregated fund returns incorporates 
diversification, supported by literary results finding time varying betas both above and below 
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one. Cao & Lerner (2009) conducts risk adjustments with respect to CAPM and the Fama-
French model for PE-backed firms. They find significant betas ranging from 1.25 to 1.30 when 
applying the CAPM, equally weighted and value weighted, respectively. The range changes 
to 1.23 to 1.25 when applying Fama-French. Korteweg and Sorensen (2010) report betas of 
0.74 for seed investments, 2.7 for early-stage investments and 2.6 for late-stage investments. 
Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2003) find “long-run” betas of 1.24 for VC-funds and 0.72 for PE-
funds in their study of the relationship between idiosyncratic risk and returns. The authors 
discuss the effect of total risk on VC funds returns, and find that their model predicts higher 
alphas, even net of fees, for funds with higher realized total risk. Fan, Fleming & Warren 
(2013) on the other hand, estimate that PE-backed firms display betas ranging from 0.85 to 
0.90 using data from the U.S. market, while VC-backed firms exhibit a beta close to 0.75. 
They emphasize that betas are inconsistent through time and display substantial variation. In 
the period of 2000 to 2008, betas of PE-backed firms exceed 2, while VC-backed firms’ betas 
exceed 1.2. Before and after this period, beta measures consistently yield values below one for 
both segments, which indicate clear cyclicality of systematic risk exposure. 
The reliability and validity of long-run performance estimates will depend on correct 
adjustment of differences in total risk. We aim at measuring betas and alphas for our aggregate 
portfolios of PE/VC and NB firms, by applying both the Fama and French 3 factor model, 
while also applying liquidity and momentum, and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). 
H5:  Risk-adjusted returns does not differ across PE/VC- and NB IPO portfolios.  
Market Capitalization 
Higher levels of market capitalization (size) has been shown to significantly reduce 
underperformance for both PE/VC and NB firms, in Bergström, Nilsson, and Wahlberg 
(2006), Cao and Lerner (2009) and Levis (2011). The former article find that value weighting 
returns renders the larger LBOs more profitable than the smaller ones, but does not explicitly 
take account of differing risk characteristics. They also hypothesize that issue size affect long-
run performance due to market sentiment. Over-optimistic investors that start reassessing their 
expectations post IPO, are more numerous in the retail segment. These investors primarily 
buys into smaller IPOs, while institutional investors focus on larger IPOs. Therefore, PE-
backing might mitigate the effect of sentiment on post IPO prices. Cao and Lerner take account 
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of differing risk characteristics, while also documenting relatively better performance when 
value weighting returns. Brav and Gompers (1997) find that underperformance in the NB 
sample is driven primarily by small issuers, i.e. those with market capitalizations less than 
USD 50 mill. They also find that VC-backed IPOs outperform NB IPOs when returns are 
equally weighted, while this effect disappears when returns are value weighted, signalling that 
smaller companies supply relatively lower returns.  
H6:  Market capitalization has no effect on long-run performance. 
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4. Data and methodology 
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4.1.1 Underpricing 
Sponsoring 
We define underpricing during the initial return period similarly as in Ritter (1991) and 
Bergström, Nilsson, and Wahlberg (2006); as the period between the offering date and the first 
day demonstrating a closing price that differ from the offering price19. The initial raw return 
of IPOi equals:  
𝑟𝑖 = 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃𝑖,1
𝑃𝑖,0
) 
 
Where Pi,0 is the offering price, while Pi,1 is the first registered price differing from the offering 
price. We then adjust the raw return for market movements by subtracting the return of a 
benchmark index, the OSEBX. This abnormal benchmark adjusted return for stock i is defined 
as:  
𝑎𝑟𝑖 =  𝑟𝑖 −  𝑟𝐵𝑀 
where 𝑎𝑟𝑖 is the abnormal return, 𝑟𝑖 is the raw initial return and 𝑟𝐵𝑀 is the benchmark return.  
In this process, we separate VC/PE IPOs from NB IPOs, calculate the abnormal initial returns, 
and then aggregate the results on a portfolio basis, both equally- and value weighted, in event 
time and calendar time. We assign weights to IPO stock returns in event time in proportion to 
their relative market capitalization, after applying a time-varying GDP deflator, to account for 
the effect of inflation on market capitalization weights. 
𝐴𝑅𝑝
𝐸𝑊 =  
1
𝑛𝑝
 ∑ 𝑎𝑟𝑖
𝑛𝑝
𝑖=1
 
𝐴𝑅𝑝
𝐸𝑊 is the equally weighted abnormal return for portfolio p, 
                                                 
19 Bergström, Nilsson and Wahlberg (2006) mention that some equities experience a lack of demand shortly following the 
IPO, which is especially pronounced among smaller, illiquid stocks, and for stocks registered in countries with inferior trading 
systems. The former is more relevant for the Norwegian market, and we report initial returns based on the first price differing 
from the offering price in cases where there are not registered any intermediate trades.  
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𝐴𝑅𝑝
𝑉𝑊 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖  ×  𝑎𝑟𝑖
𝑛𝑝
𝑖=1
 
and 𝐴𝑅𝑝
𝑉𝑊 is the value weighted abnormal return for portfolio p.  
Market Capitalization and Risk 
We calculate equity betas for companies with at least three years of activity post IPO and run 
a cross sectional multiple regression with deflated market capitalization, equity betas and a 
PE/VC-dummy as independent variables, and raw firm level, simple, benchmark adjusted 
initial returns (underpricing) as the dependent variable: 
𝐵𝑀 𝑎𝑑𝑗.  𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝. ) + 𝛽2(𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎) + 𝛽3(𝑃𝐸/𝑉𝐶) +  𝑢𝑡 
We include maximum five years of returns post IPO for the beta calculations, to capture the 
market sensitivity originating from a limited period following the IPO event. We have to 
consider the assumptions underlying the OLS model when running a multiple regression. We 
list these in Appendix 6.1 and comment on relevant aspects of each assumption in the analysis, 
under section 4.2.3. In addition to the regression model, we account for the effect of size by 
value-weighting the benchmark-adjusted initial returns by GDP-deflated market capitalization 
values and aggregate on a portfolio levels. Deflating accounts for inflation by adjusting the 
relative weights of each firms’ market capitalization and aligns it with the base year of 2010, 
while value-weighting initial returns emphasize the effect of large capitalization firms.   
4.1.2 Long-Run Performance 
Sponsoring 
We collect returns from the firms’ total return indexes, supplied by Datastream, which shows 
a theoretical growth in the value of a share, assuming re-invested of dividends. The total return 
index accounts for capital operations, like stock splits or reversed stock splits.  
𝑅𝐼𝑡 =  𝑅𝐼𝑡−1  ×  
𝑃𝐼𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑡−1
 ×  (1 +  
𝐷𝑌𝑡
100
 ×  
1
𝑁
)  
Where 𝑅𝐼𝑡 equals the return index level at the 1
st day of month t, 𝑅𝐼𝑡−1 equals the return index 
level in the previous month, 𝑃𝐼𝑡 equals the price index level in month t, 𝑃𝐼𝑡−1 equals the price 
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index level in the previous month, 𝐷𝑌𝑡 = dividend yield percentage in month t and N = number 
of working days in the year (taken to be 260). The raw20 return of stock i is then calculated as:  
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑙𝑛 (
𝑅𝐼𝑡
𝑅𝐼𝑡−1
) 
While we calculate the simple21 returns as:  
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  (
𝑅𝐼𝑡 − 𝑅𝐼𝑡−1
𝑅𝐼𝑡−1
) 
We distinguish between simple/logarithmic returns, and raw/weighted returns explicitly, as 
we highlight the differing distribution properties in the analysis. Logarithmic returns attain 
algorithmic properties incorporating the effect of compounding and enables us to aggregate 
on portfolio level by simply summing up the values. In addition, logarithmic returns also 
attains normality properties. However, they emphasize the effect of returns deviating from 
zero, effectively distorting the distribution properties relative to simple returns, which serves 
better in displaying differences between sample values on firm level.  
We measure long-run performance over six months, one-, three- and five years, excluding 
initial returns. The reasons for excluding the initial return is that not all investors are able to 
participate in the offering during the periods of high initial returns, and that these returns also 
might incorporate effects irrelevant for the long-run fundamental value of the offering firm22. 
Measuring returns over shorter time spans than the traditional three to five year period, enables 
us to investigate whether it is profitable to hold IPOs over shorter periods. When a stock is 
delisted, we distribute the value amount across the remaining firms in the portfolio, both 
                                                 
20 𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 =  [
(𝑅𝐼𝑡−𝑅𝐼𝑡−1)
𝑅𝐼𝑡−1
]  ↔  𝑙𝑛 [
𝑅𝐼𝑡
𝑅𝐼𝑡−1
], as opposed to 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 =  {(𝑙𝑛 [
𝑅𝐼𝑡
𝑅𝐼𝑡−1
]) × 𝑤𝑖  𝑜𝑟 
1
𝑛𝑃
} ↔ {([
(𝑅𝐼𝑡−𝑅𝐼𝑡−1)
𝑅𝐼𝑡−1
] ) × 𝑤𝑖 𝑜𝑟 
1
𝑛𝑃
} 
21 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 =  [
(𝑅𝐼𝑡−𝑅𝐼𝑡−1)
𝑅𝐼𝑡−1
], as opposed to  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 =  𝑙𝑛 [
𝑅𝐼𝑡
𝑅𝐼𝑡−1
] 
22 In Bergström, Nilsson, and Wahlberg (2006), the authors argue that underwriters allocate the lion’s share of new issues to 
institutional investors, as these are less likely to realize their investments in pursuit of short-term gains. If not so, anyone 
would be able to buy into new IPOs, realize the investment and obtain the often-observed double-digit initial returns during 
a time-span of a few hours/days. Unarguably, this situation would not be sustainable, as released pressure on the sell-side 
would cause declining prices and diminishing returns. Underwriters aim at supporting the share price subsequent to the IPO, 
and are unlikely to allocate shares to parties that trigger sales, indicating that preferential share allocation sustain high initial 
returns. The argument supports the notion that initial returns and long-term fundamental value are unrelated, which is why 
we choose to replicate their approach.   
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equally-weighted and in proportion to their relative weight. We further apply two measures of 
long-run performance applied in Ritter (1991) and Bergström, Nilsson, and Wahlberg (2006), 
CAR and BHR:  
(1) Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) calculated with monthly rebalancing and the OSEBX 
as benchmark, for both PE/VC- and NB firms, equally- and value-weighted in event time. 
Equally weighted returns captures the effect of differing management quality, while keeping 
the effect of size restricted to value weighted returns. This might in turn be more relevant from 
an investor’s perspective, as no investor is likely to hold an equal amount of each stock in any 
portfolio. In addition, the latter will highlight the effect of size. CARs have the drawback of 
potentially returning cumulative returns more than 100% negative, but serves well as a 
comparative measure of different groups of IPOs across time. We calculate the benchmark 
adjusted abnormal return as:  
𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑟𝐵𝑀,𝑡 
 
where 𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the monthly abnormal return of IPO i, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the monthly raw
23 initial return for 
IPO i and 𝑟𝐵𝑀,𝑡 is the monthly benchmark return.  We separate PE/VC-backed from non-
backed firms, calculate the abnormal returns, and then aggregate the results on a portfolio 
basis. We calculate the equal weighted portfolio of abnormal returns by adding the abnormal 
returns of n IPOs during month t. 
𝐴𝑅𝑝,𝑡
𝐸𝑊 =  
1
𝑛𝑝
 ∑ 𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑛𝑝
𝑖=1
 
where 𝐴𝑅𝑝,𝑡
𝐸𝑊 is the equally weighted abnormal return of portfolio p in month t. The value-
weighted portfolio return formula is defined as: 
𝐴𝑅𝑝,𝑡
𝑉𝑊 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖,𝑡  ×  𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑛𝑝
𝑖=1
 
                                                 
23 Prior to weighting returns, either by value or number of firms.  
  
65 
Where 𝑤𝑖,𝑡 is the weight of the stock i in relation to the total size of portfolio p in month t, and 
𝐴𝑅𝑝,𝑡
𝑉𝑊 is the value weighted abnormal return for portfolio p in month t. Market capitalization 
weights are aligned to the base year of 2010 using a time-varying GDP deflator. We 
accumulate both measures separately in event time, regardless of issue date, to obtain a CAR 
for each weighting method:  
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡−𝑇 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
After calculating the CARs, we replicate the methodology in Ritter (1991) when applying t-
tests on the differences between portfolios, across time. The t-statistics for the equally/value-
weighted abnormal portfolio return for month t is computed for each month as:  
𝐴𝑅𝑡−𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐
𝐸𝑊/𝑉𝑊
 
=  𝐴𝑅 𝑡
𝐸𝑊/𝑉𝑊 ×
√𝑛𝑡
𝑠𝑑𝑡
 
where 𝐴𝑅𝑡 is the equally/value-weighted abnormal return for month t, 𝑛𝑡  is the number of 
observations in month t, and 𝑠𝑑𝑡  is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the adjusted 
returns for month t. The t-statistic for the cumulative abnormal return in month t, 𝐶𝐴𝑅1,𝑡 , is 
computed as:  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡−𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐
𝐸𝑊/𝑉𝑊
= 𝐶𝐴𝑅 1,𝑡
𝐸𝑊/𝑉𝑊 ×
√𝑛𝑡
𝑐𝑠𝑑𝑡
 
where 𝑛𝑡  is the number of firms trading in each month, and 𝑐𝑠𝑑𝑡 is computed as: 
{𝑐𝑠𝑑𝑡 = [𝑡 ∗ 𝑣𝑎𝑟 + 2(𝑡 − 1) ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑣]
1
2}, where 𝑡 is the event month, 𝑣𝑎𝑟 is the average (over 
60 months) cross-sectional variance, and 𝑐𝑜𝑣 is the first-order autocovariance of the ARt series.  
  
 
Subsequent to finding CARs in event time, we calculate value-weighted buy-and-hold returns 
(BHR) in calendar time.  
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(2) We measure six months, one-, three- and five-year buy-and-hold returns (BHR) in calendar 
time for both PE/VC and NB IPOs. Calendar time BHRs account for the periods of high and 
low market valuations, in other words it captures the effect of “hot market” issues. We 
calculate BHRs in the following way:  
𝑅𝑝,𝑇 =  ∏  
𝑇
𝑡=1
(1 +  𝑟𝑝,𝑡) 
where 𝑅𝑝,𝑇 is the portfolio’s BHR measured without the initial returns, from the first month 
subsequent to the year of the offering, over time T, and 𝑟𝑝,𝑡 is the sum of the portfolio firms’ 
returns in month t. We invest a value-weighted share in each IPO at the first trading day 
subsequent to the year of flotation and redistribute the value amount according to each IPOs 
relative weight, when a firm delists, while rebalancing monthly. We then divide the BHRs of 
the IPO portfolios by the BHRs of the OSEBX, accumulated through the same period in time, 
in order to compute Wealth Relatives (WR):  
𝑊𝑅𝑝,𝑇 =  
𝑅𝑝,𝑇
𝑅𝐵𝑀,𝑇
 
where 𝑅𝐵𝑀,𝑇 is the BHR of the OSEBX. A WR < 1 indicate that portfolio p underperformed 
the market, while a WR > 1 indicate that portfolio p outperformed the market. 
An issue that arises from both methods is the implicit risk considerations applied. Both 
methods adjust returns by some benchmark, usually a broad aggregate one, reflecting the 
market. This implies a beta equal to one, which may not be the case.  
Risk 
We address risk both using CAPM and the multifactor model of Fama and French (1992), 
while also adding liquidity and momentum factors, separately, to the model. Carhart (1997) 
proposes the momentum factor as an extension to the Fama and French three-factor model, 
while the liquidity factor originates from Pástor and Stambaugh (2003). Assistant Professor, 
Francisco Santos at NHH, recommended these additional factors to us, as they may explain 
risk exposures well due to the limited size and pronounced illiquidity of numerous stocks 
traded on the OSE. 
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When running ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions on time series data, we have to account 
for numerous assumptions, listed in Appendix 6.4. We form monthly portfolios in calendar 
time by including the returns in month t of all available issues that were listed in the five years 
previous to the month of the observation, as we are primarily interested in the risk of newly 
listed companies. Subsequent to various adjustments, described in the analysis, we run the 
following regressions on a portfolio level:  
𝑟𝑝,𝑡
𝐸𝑊 −  𝑟𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑝 (𝑟𝑀,𝑡 −  𝑟𝑓,𝑡) +  𝑢𝑡 
where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡
𝐸𝑊 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 is the aggregated, equally weighted portfolio return in month t, less the 
Norwegian three month treasury bill rate 𝑟𝑓,𝑡, 𝛼 is the regressions intercept, interpreted as the 
potential risk-adjusted abnormal return, 𝛽 is the slope of the regression line between IPO 
portfolio p and the OSEBX returns less the treasury bill rate (𝑟𝑀,𝑡 −  𝑟𝑓,𝑡), and 𝑢𝑡 is the error 
term. The OSEBX index is defined as a value-weighted index24. The same analogy applies for 
value-weighted returns.  
𝑟𝑝,𝑡
𝑉𝑊 −  𝑟𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑝 (𝑟𝑀,𝑡 −  𝑟𝑓,𝑡) +  𝑢𝑡 
We use the equity-, rather than asset betas from the CAPM regressions above, and the multi 
factor regressions below. It is argued in Fama and French (1992) that the combination of the 
size- and value-factors absorbs the apparent roles of leverage in average stock returns. 
However, our CAPM alphas and betas incorporates the effect of leverage when risk-adjusting 
the returns of the different IPO groups. Further, we regress on the differences in portfolio 
returns, equally- and value-weighted, to identify points of distinctions for the explanatory 
variables and the risk-adjusted returns between the two groups of IPOs:  
(𝑟𝑃𝐸,𝑡
𝐸𝑊/𝑉𝑊 −  𝑟𝑓,𝑡) − (𝑟𝑁𝐵,𝑡
𝐸𝑊/𝑉𝑊 −  𝑟𝑓,𝑡)  =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑝 (𝑟𝑀,𝑡 −  𝑟𝑓,𝑡) +  𝑢𝑡 
                                                 
24 We are aware that this might bias the estimates when regressed on equally weighted returns. However, we observe that 
none of the international studies distinguishes between these properties of the index when performing their analyses across 
samples (EW/VW). In other words, we use the value-weighted OSEBX index also for equally weighted portfolios. 
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Additionally, we run multiple regressions including the risk factors of SMB25 and HML26 
separately, before isolating the incremental effect of the liquidity- (LIQ)27 and momentum-
factors (UMD)28: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡
𝐸𝑊/𝑉𝑊 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑝 (𝑟𝑀,𝑡 −  𝑟𝑓,𝑡) +  𝑠
(𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡) + ℎ(𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡) +  𝑢𝑡 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡
𝐸𝑊 −  𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑝(𝑟𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝑠(𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡) + ℎ(𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡) + [ 𝑙(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡) + 𝑚(𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡)] +  𝑢𝑡 
where 𝑠, ℎ, 𝑙 and 𝑚 are the factor loadings on (𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡), (𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡), (𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡) and (𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡), 
respectively. Similar to the CAPM calculations, we run the regressions on returns in calendar 
time, by including the returns in month t of all available issues that were listed in the five years 
previous to the month of the observation, equally and value weighted, and on the estimated 
portfolios’ differences in returns.  
In addition to running regressions covering the full sample period of 01.01.1996 to 31.12.2012, 
we run rolling regressions with a moving and overlapping window, covering 24 months for 
each monthly observation. This involves an overlap of 23 months for each estimated 
coefficient and intercept. We apply the extended Fama-French model including liquidity and 
momentum for these calculations. Applying rolling regressions enables us to evaluate the time-
varying properties of both the alpha-estimates, and the factor-loadings of all the portfolios.  
                                                 
25 Small Minus Big, i.e., the return of a portfolio of small-capitalization stocks in excess of the return on a portfolio of large-
capitalization stocks.  
[𝑆𝑀𝐵 =
1
3
(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ) −
1
3
(𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ)] 
26 High Minus Low, i.e., the return of a portfolio of stocks with a high book-to-market ratio in excess of the return on a 
portfolio of stocks with a low book-to-market ratio.  
[𝐻𝑀𝐿 =
1
2
(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) −
1
2
(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ)] 
27 Liquidity, i.e., the return of a portfolio that is long in low-turnover stocks and short in high-turnover stocks. For details on 
how to create the portfolios, cf. Pástor and Stambaug (2003). 
28 Up Minus Down, i.e., the average return on the two high prior return portfolios minus the average return on the two low 
prior return portfolios.  
[𝑀𝑂𝑀 =
1
2
(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ) −
1
2
(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑤 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝐿𝑜𝑤)] 
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Market Capitalization 
The effect of firm size is indicated by the value-weighted returns applied in both the BHR 
and CAR estimates, and also factors in when calculating the risk-adjusted returns from the 
CAPM and multi-factor models.  
4.2 Potential biases 
4.2.1 Survivorship Bias 
We believe we mitigate survivorship bias in applying CARs and BHRs, as they reveal 
performance differences across the IPO groups (PE/VC versus NB) well, and incorporates the 
effect of bankruptcy. Poor performers suffering bankruptcy inflicts negative returns leading 
up to the actual event, which accumulated through time, compounds and returns a terminal 
value reflecting the effect of firms disappearing from the sample. Likewise, we account for 
the premium that often originates from acquisitions by rebalancing subsequent to the purchase. 
We argue that we observe both winners and losers through the entire sample period, limiting 
this potential bias.  
4.2.2 Omitted Variables Bias 
Omitted variables occurs when a model incorrectly leaves out one or more important causal 
factors. We believe this problem to be most severe in the regression model attempting to 
explain levels of underpricing. The remaining models, explaining long-run performance, are 
based on acknowledged empirical results, which leaves less room for spurious results. One 
way to mitigate omitted variables bias, involves including additional explanatory variables to 
the model. Originally, we estimated our regression in section 4.2.3 using only market 
capitalization and a PE/VC-dummy. Subsequently, we added equity betas (proxy for risk, 
accounting for leverage), as the original regression yielded a negative adjusted R2 and 
insignificant coefficients. In this way, we have accounted for every explanatory variable 
emphasized in the literature, except for the retained equity share at the flotation date. However, 
these data were unavailable to us.  
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4.2.3 New Listings Bias 
This bias concerns the effect of differing life cycles of our sample firms and the firms 
comprising the index. Both the CAR and BHR calculations measures performance following 
the IPO, by subtracting the benchmark returns, prior to aggregating on portfolio levels. If the 
benchmark returns are unrepresentative of our portfolio firms’ returns, it might bias our results. 
We have applied multifactor models for the risk-adjusted returns’ calculations, where the 
additional factors proxy for explanatory variables beyond the simple CAPM model. This way, 
we allocate explanatory power to features like value, growth, liquidity and momentum, 
effectively reducing the bias inherent in using only the index.  
4.2.4 Rebalancing Bias 
This bias arises due to the different periodic rebalancing between the portfolios and the 
OSEBX-benchmark. The OSEBX is rebalanced every 6th month, while we rebalance our 
portfolios every month, rendering the benchmark and the portfolios less comparable. 
4.2.5 Skewness Bias 
Barber and Lyon (1997) argues that long-run CARs often display a positive skew, of returns 
and t-statistics. We account for this by trimming the upper and lower sample values in the 
CAR calculations to obtain reliable estimates. Additionally, all our trimmed CAR t-tests return 
highly significant negative t-statistics. If they were unbiased, they would be even more 
negative, limiting the practical implications of this bias.  
4.2.6 Outliers 
We account for outliers by trimming our sample values, removing 2,5 % of the most extreme 
values in each direction (two-sided). Bloch (1966) argues that trimmed/truncated means are 
robust estimators, as they are less sensitive to unlikely, extreme events than the full sample 
mean. Bloch argues that the trimmed mean provides a more reliable insight on the central 
tendency of a sample distribution. However, we have only trimmed our cross-sectional data 
of initial returns, while leaving our time-series portfolio returns’ unadjusted. This could bias 
our estimates when applying CAPM and multi-factor models on portfolio returns, especially 
due to REC’s combination of high market capitalization and volatile stock returns. However, 
  
71 
we include a maximum of 60 months’ returns history to account for development related to 
the IPO event.  
4.2.7 Sampling- and Methodological Errors 
Our data originates from various sources, posing a potential problem of sampling error. The 
population of IPOs, obtained from OSE’s “list-changes”-documents, representing a fairly 
reliable source. Manually having to adjust this information might distort some of our results, 
while posing no serious problems for our analysis. We have received information on PE/VC-
deals from Carsten Bienz, Associate Professor of NHH’s Argentum Centre for Private Equity. 
While the source seems reliable, the data originates from both media coverage and 
observations by Argentum. This might create biases, but we have tried to mitigate this problem 
by manually confirming the presence of PE/VC-funds prior to the IPO events by using 
information available online.  
Concerning underpricing, we lack a sizable part of the full sample firms’ initial returns, both 
for PE/VC and NB IPOs, mainly due to unavailable prospectuses. This might invalidate 
inference if the sample firms’ characteristics deviated from those of the population. However, 
we believe it is improbable that companies unrepresentative of the population would be more 
likely to enter our subsample. 
4.2.8 Measurement Error 
Measurement error is the difference between the measured and true value of a variable. It is 
difficult to assess whether our estimated coefficients represent the population coefficients, but 
we have applied different econometric approaches to evaluate the potential for errors, and in 
turn carried out corrections and transformations where necessary. A frequent problem with 
time-series data, involves auto-correlation among the error terms, potentially invalidating 
inference based on the resulting standard errors. We observe no serious problems with 
autocorrelation, but still run regressions with Newey-West Heteroskedasticity and 
Autocorrelation robust standard errors. Additionally, we test for unit root using Dickey-Fuller 
tests, which returns test-statistics below the critical value for each data-series, indicating we 
do not have a problem with unit root.   
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5. Analysis 
5.1 Data Collection 
We were able to identify PE/VC backed IPOs in a stepwise process. We collected data from 
OSE of all IPOs from 01.01.96 to 31.12.2010, which we collocated with a list of PE/VC deals 
that we received from Associate Professor Carsten Bienz, director of NHH’s Argentum Centre 
for Private Equity. After 2010, none of the floated firms were involved with PE/VC firms, 
except for Asetek, listed on March 20th by Northzone Ventures. We cross-referenced our 
observations with information available at the web pages of every PE/VC company, in order 
to certify that each company was involved with a fund prior to going public (Appendix 6.5). 
We have not set a lower limit on ownership when including a given company in our sample. 
However, given the operational structure of PE/VC funds, in obtaining board positions and 
performing active ownership, we believe any biases are limited.  
Our sample covers IPOs originating from both OSE and Oslo Axess, while dropping Aker 
drilling, DNBNOR, Gjensidige NOR29 and Tanker Navigation, as we were not able to find 
reliable return series. Further, we have included demergers among IPOs, as these operate as 
individual legal entities subsequent to the disinvestment from the concern, while 
simultaneously being listed as separate IPOs by the OSE. In total, 365 companies went public 
during our sample period, where 67 were actively managed by a PE/VC fund prior to their 
listing. The limited size of this sub-sample might confine our potential for statistical inference, 
and will leave some of our BHR calculations ambiguous, as several years experience slumps 
in PE/VC backed IPOs. Our sample period covers the dot.com-bubble of 2000/2001 and the 
recent subprime credit crisis of 2007/2008, which seemingly have affected the IPO volume 
distribution across years.   
 
 
                                                 
29 Both DNB and Gjensidige NOR were listed at separate entities prior to our observed IPOs. However, subsequent to their 
merger in 2003, both companies continued as a combined firm; DNBNOR. We are unable to find reliable return series after 
the merger.  
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Table 4.1 
IPO Volume Distribution Across Years 
The tables displays the volume distribution of PE/VC and NB IPOs, respectively, going public on the OSE and Oslo Axess 
over the period of 1996 to 2010. Panel A displays the frequency of each group in absolute terms, Panel B; relative to the full 
sample across years and Panel C; relative between groups each year.  
 
 
 
5.2 Underpricing 
For our original sample of 298 NB IPOs and 67 PE/VC IPOs, we were able to identify offering 
prices for 160 NB IPOs and 59 PE/VC IPOs, from OSE’s Newsweb. We supplemented 
missing data and crosschecked the data we found with the observations of two master theses 
from NHH; Hoxha and Glad (2010) and Broks and Båtstrand (2008). The first prices that 
differed from the offering prices were collected both from OSE’s “list changes”-documents 
and Datastream, in order to calculate initial returns. We used Datastream to ensure that stocks 
experiencing a period of static prices after the IPO were not traded in the intermediate period 
between the offering date and the first day displaying a different price. We obtained the daily 
OSEBX total return index and IPO firms’ first registered market capitalization from 
Datastream. In addition, we have deflated each companies’ market capitalization with a time-
varying GDP deflator, in order to assign weights to IPO returns in proportion to their relative 
size.  
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
PE/VC 2 6 4 2 6 2 2 1 8 15 7 8 1 0 3 67
NB 20 51 23 8 22 15 3 3 14 30 25 49 15 3 17 298
Total 22 57 27 10 28 17 5 4 22 45 32 57 16 3 20 365
Panel A
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
PE/VC 3 % 9 % 6 % 3 % 9 % 3 % 3 % 1 % 12 % 22 % 10 % 12 % 1 % 0 % 4 % 100 %
NB 7 % 17 % 8 % 3 % 7 % 5 % 1 % 1 % 5 % 10 % 8 % 16 % 5 % 1 % 6 % 100 %
Total 6 % 16 % 7 % 3 % 8 % 5 % 1 % 1 % 6 % 12 % 9 % 16 % 4 % 1 % 5 % 100 %
Panel B
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
PE/VC 9 % 11 % 15 % 20 % 21 % 12 % 40 % 25 % 36 % 33 % 22 % 14 % 6 % 0 % 15 %
NB 91 % 89 % 85 % 80 % 79 % 88 % 60 % 75 % 64 % 67 % 78 % 86 % 94 % 100 % 85 %
Total 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
Panel C
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5.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.2 
Descriptive Statistics of Initial Returns- / Underpricing-Data 
We define underpricing as the period between the offering date and the first day demonstrating a closing price that differ from 
the offering price, provided there is no intermediate trading; [𝑟𝑖 =  𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑖,1/𝑃𝑖,0)], and report the results on an aggregated 
portfolio level, adjusted for the OSEBX return over the same period. We also report the raw, benchmark-adjusted, simple, 
initial returns’ distribution properties, at firm level. Our sample data covers initial returns for 160 NB IPOs and 59 PE/VC-
backed IPOs, as the remaining ones lacked reliable offering prices. Each firms’ market capitalization has been deflated using 
a time-varying GDP-deflator to correctly adjust value-weighted returns. We account for outliers by reporting symmetrically 
trimmed values in parenthesis, where we have removed extreme observations lying in the upper and lower 2,5 percentiles. 
For the raw initial returns sample, we remove absolute values, while we rearrange according to the product of market weights 
and returns for the VW {𝑤𝑖  ×  𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡} sample and the fraction of return and number of firms {
1
𝑛𝑝
 𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡} for the EW sample, prior 
to trimming. Subsequently, we recalculate the remaining returns according to new weights/fractions. We calculate raw 
underpricing on firm level as simple, rather than logarithmic returns for two reasons; 1) both measures yield normalized 
values 2) simple returns yield intuitive results, while logarithmic returns will amplify/moderate negative/positive values and 
might return values lower than -100 %. On a portfolio level however, this is desirable, as logarithmic returns incorporate 
compounding while retaining its normality properties. 
 
Deflated Market 
Capitalization
Raw Inital Returns            
Firm Level
EW Initial Returns        
Portfolio Level
VW Initial Returns      
Portfolio Level
Million NOK Simple, Benchmark-adj. Logarithmic, Benchmark-adj. Logarithmic, Benchmark-adj.
Minimum 61 (106) -59,36 % (-23,87 %) -1,54 % (-0,46 %) -0,33 % (-0,33 %)
Maximum 66 446 (11 914) 60,01 % (54,70 %) 0,79 % (0,74 %) 7,55 % (1,00 %)
Median 809 (809) 1,08 % (1,08 %) 0,02 % (0,01 %) 0,00 % (0,00 %)
Mean 2 950 (1 657) 3,64 % (3,48 %) 0,03 % (0,05 %) 0,23 % (0,04 %)
Standard Deviation 8 876 (2 155) 18,85 % (13,04 %) 0,33 % (0,21 %) 1,13 % (0,18 %)
Skewness 0,42 (1,17) -1,51 (0,50) 5,75 (3,13)
Kurtosis 3,73 (3,68) 8,51 (2,08) 34,23 (15,80)
Deflated Market 
Capitalization
Raw Inital Returns            
Firm Level
EW Initial Returns        
Portfolio Level
VW Initial Returns      
Portfolio Level
Million NOK Simple, Benchmark-adj. Logarithmic, Benchmark-adj. Logarithmic, Benchmark-adj.
Minimum 4 (75) -78,28 % (-27,88 %) -0,96 % (-0,20 %) -0,24 % (-0,53 %)
Maximum 220 235 (19 789) 413,27 % (69,07 %) 1,01 % (0,33 %) 0,82 % (2,05 %)
Median 879 (879) 3,67 % (3,67 %) 0,02 % (0,02 %) 0,00 % (0,01 %)
Mean 4 207 (1 772) 9,35 % (6,04 %) 0,03 % (0,03 %) 0,02 % (0,04 %)
Standard Deviation 19 680 (2 648) 40,39 % (15,12 %) 0,16 % (0,09 %) 0,09 % (0,20 %)
Skewness 6,78 (1,17) 0,09 (0,52) 4,96 (6,35)
Kurtosis 64,18 (2,78) 16,80 (1,69) 41,70 (62,95)
Raw Inital Returns            
Firm Level
EW Initial Returns        
Portfolio Level
VW Initial Returns      
Portfolio Level
Simple, Benchmark-adj. Logarithmic, Benchmark-adj. Logarithmic, Benchmark-adj.
NB
PE/VC
Normal Distributions
*Numbers in parenthesis are 
calculated applying 
symmetrically trimmed 
samples, cf. table info.
PE/VC Norm. Dist. NB Norm. Dist. PE/VC Adj. Norm. Dist. NB Adj. Norm. Dist.
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At first glance, NB IPOs appears larger in terms of size, but after adjusting for outliers, we 
observe that the mean and standard deviation of both groups aligns. The minimum market 
capitalization of four million NOK for the NB sample results from deflating. The raw, firm 
level, benchmark-adjusted returns’ sample also show extreme values, with a range varying 
from -59,36 % to 60,01 % for PE/VC and -78,28 % to 413,27 %30 for NB IPOs. When we trim 
the returns, these ranges substantially narrows and nearly aligns, rendering the distributions 
quite similar. However, NB initial raw returns exhibit a median three times as high (3,67 % 
vs. 1,08 %) and a mean nearly twice the size (6,04 % vs. 3,48 %) relative to that of PE/VC 
initial raw returns, after adjusting for outliers.   
On portfolio level, the equally-weighted returns are not comparable, as the sample sizes differ. 
In order to make the value-weighted returns more comparable, we adjust for outliers. Prior to 
trimming, it is worth mentioning that the combination of Renewable Energy Corporation’s 
(REC) initial market capitalization weight of 38 % and underpricing of 19,79 % severely 
distorts the distribution properties. Trimmed returns reduces the mean and standard deviation 
by a factor of 6 for the PE/VC sample and renders these properties quite similar, while the 
skew and kurtosis of the NB sample still remains nearly twice and quadruple the size of the 
PE/VC sample (6,35/3,13 and 62,95/15,80). This indicates a positively skewed and highly 
leptokurtic distribution for the NB sample, resulting from infrequent extreme deviations from 
the mean, as opposed to frequent, modestly sized deviations. Observant readers might notice 
that the sample space between the minimum and maximum value for the NB VW sample 
actually widens for the trimmed sample. This might seems counter intuitive, but results from 
recalculations of weighted returns subsequent to removing the largest ones from the original 
sample. This also increases the distribution’s kurtosis. We include combined frequency- and 
normal distributions in Appendix 6.6.  
 
 
                                                 
30 The initial return of Camposol Holding.  
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5.2.2 Sponsoring 
Table 4.3 
Underpricing in Event Time 
The table displays equally- and value-weighted average underpricing of PE/VC-backed and non-backed IPOs in event time. 
We define underpricing as the period between the offering date and the first day demonstrating a closing price that differ from 
the offering price. We calculate initial logarithmic raw returns as: 𝑟𝑖 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑖,1/𝑃𝑖,0), where Pi,0 is the offering price, while 
Pi,1 is the first closing price differing from the offering price. We adjust for benchmark returns using the OSEBX index during 
the same period in time, and aggregate the values into portfolios. Additionally, we report trimmed portfolio initial returns in 
parenthesis, adjusted for extreme values in the upper and lower 2,5 percentiles of the distributions. For a more thorough 
explanation, confer the previous table.   
 
 
*numbers in parenthesis are calculated applying symmetrically trimmed samples, cf. Table info 
 
The unadjusted equally-weighted portfolios indicate that small capitalization, NB IPOs 
underprice more heavily, while narrowing somewhat when applying trimming, to about two 
percent. The value weighted unadjusted portfolios on the other hand display marked 
underpricing of PE/VC IPOs, but as we have mentioned, RECs abnormally high market 
capitalization in combination with its substantial underpricing leaves the results ambiguous. 
When applying trimming to both samples, NB IPOs seems to underprice marginally higher, 
by about one percent on average. The VW unadjusted portfolio leaves the impression of higher 
underpricing amongst large PE/VC IPOs, while the opposite is true for NB IPOs. However, 
trimmed values show that larger issues experience marginally higher underpricing for both 
groups of IPOs, which contradicts conventional international results. In general, the adjusted 
samples yields results showing lower underpricing among PE/VC IPOs for both small and 
large issues. Our results are indicative of PE/VC actors being marginally better at pricing 
issues, leaving less money on the table for investors, even though tests fail to supply us with 
any significant t-statistics for differences in means for either equally or value weighted 
portfolios31. Our results show marginally lower underpricing of PE/VC IPOs, but our limited 
sample sizes restricts our inferential abilities. 
                                                 
31 We test for differences in means between sample groups, across equally- and value-weighted portfolios, using Welch’s t-
test for samples of unequal variance and size, as N = 160 for NB and N = 59 for PE/VC, and N=144 for NB and N=55 for 
PE/VC in the adjusted samples.  
 
Unadjusted EW portfolios:  p-value of 0,33  Unadjusted VW portfolios:  p-value of 0,16 
Adjusted EW portfolios:  p-value of 0,27  Adjusted VW portfolios: p-value of 0,21 
Portfolio Underpricing PE/VC NB
Equally Weighted 1,84 % (2,72%) 5,09 % (4,78%)
Value Weighted 13,42 % (3,85%) 3,03 % (4,81 %)
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Figure 4.1 
Initial Returns’ Frequency- and Normal Distributions 
Frequency distributions of raw, simple, benchmark-adjusted PE/VC- and NB returns with normal distributions. We use simple 
rather than logarithmic returns to illustrate the distribution of underpricing on firm level, as we only apply the initially 
calculated logarithmic returns when aggregating additively on a portfolio level. The dotted line illustrates the change in the 
NB normal distribution when excluding the extreme observation of Camposol (413,27 %). We illustrate relative frequency 
distributions due to differing sample sizes.       
 
We are unable to find significant differences between the portfolios comprised of equally and 
value weighted logarithmic initial returns, but as the frequency distributions above illustrate, 
there are substantial differences in the raw, simple returns’ data set. While assigning weights 
attribute towards distinguishing between large and small firms’ contribution to the results, the 
distribution above is purely descriptive and ignores size. Additionally, returns are calculated 
as simple returns, rather than logarithmic, leaving a more realistic impression of the actual, 
firm level, initial returns distribution. NB IPOs display some pronounced extreme values, and 
the lion’s share of the observations lies in the interval between 10 % and 20 %. The PE/VC 
IPO samples returns mainly lies in the interval between 0 % and 10 %, while also displaying 
fewer infrequent and extreme values, as the kurtosis clearly indicates (3,73 for PE/VC, 64,18 
for NB). Even after adjusting for Camposol’s initial return of 413,27 %, the NB sample still 
exhibit a higher standard deviation than the PE/VC sample. In other words, even though the 
                                                 
 
Unadjusted VW portfolios :  p-value of 0,16 Adjusted VW portfo lios :  p-value of 0,21 
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
R
el
a
ti
v
e 
F
re
q
u
en
cy
 (
%
)
PE/VC Frequency (%) NB Frequency (%)
PE/VC Norm. Dist. NB Norm. Dist.
NB Norm. Dist. (Excluding Camposol's Initial Return)
  
78
theoretically constructed portfolios display no significant differences, we observe marked 
differences in the raw initial returns’ data set.  
Table 4.4 
Underpricing/Initial Returns in Calendar Time 
Average equally-weighted underpricing of PE/VC and NB IPOs, respectively, in calendar time. Underpricing equals the initial 
return in the period between the IPO day and the first day demonstrating a closing price other than the opening list price, 
provided there is no intermediate trading. We adjust for the OSEBX return over the same period in time. 
 
 
 
The PE/VC yearly cohorts suffers from small and highly varying sample sizes, leaving 
statistical testing for differences in means across and between years, impractical. In addition, 
due to the small size of the PE/VC sample for most cohorts, it is difficult to compare any given 
year’s underpricing across the two groups. Despite these issues, we have listed the results 
above to illustrate differences and comment on distinctive values.  
The largest deviation in underpricing between the two groups of IPOs originates from 1999, 
where PE/VC IPOs, on average supplied an initial return of 29,88 %, while NB IPOs was 
overpriced by 23,50 %. The only PE/VC-backed firms floated in 1999 were Infostream and 
Axis-Shield, where the former supplied investors with an initial return of 44 %, and the latter 
16 %. Because NB IPOs on average were overpriced this year, the difference seems 
pronounced, while it in fact may have arisen purely by chance. Additionally, PE/VC-backed 
Year PE/VC N NB N Diff. (PE/VC-NB)
1996 -              -     -              -     -                    
1997 12,62 % 6 14,61 % 33 -1,99 %
1998 -0,60 % 3 7,97 % 11 -8,57 %
1999 29,88 % 2 -23,50 % 5 53,37 %
2000 -4,32 % 6 -10,46 % 10 6,13 %
2001 -6,05 % 1 10,84 % 7 -16,89 %
2002 -43,45 % 2 -3,64 % 1 -39,81 %
2003 -9,79 % 1 3,27 % 1 -13,05 %
2004 0,83 % 6 4,19 % 6 -3,36 %
2005 6,86 % 14 5,29 % 21 1,57 %
2006 4,65 % 7 2,79 % 14 1,87 %
2007 0,97 % 8 2,97 % 27 -2,01 %
2008 -              -     15,77 % 10 -                             
2009 -              -     -2,30 % 2 -                             
2010 -12,60 % 3 -1,04 % 12 -11,56 %
Sum 59      160
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IPOs seems to be highly overpriced relative to NB IPOs during the period of 2001-2003, while 
a closer look reveals that this period also suffers from few observations. The remaining cohorts 
display similar underpricing between the two groups of IPOs. It is worth mentioning that 24 
% of the PE/VC sample- and 13 % of the NB sample goes public in 2005, a year where both 
groups supply quite similar initial returns. We observe that, on average, across all yearly 
cohorts, PE/VC IPOs display marginal overpricing (μ = -1,75 %, σ = 16 %), while NB IPOs 
are marginally underpriced (μ = 1,91 %, σ = 10 %). 
5.2.3 Market Capitalization and Risk 
Table 4.5 
Explanatory Factors of Underpricing 
We run a multiple regression on raw firm level, simple, benchmark-adjusted initial returns for PE/VC- and NB IPOs with 
deflated market capitalization (using a time-varying  GDP-deflator), equity betas and a dummy-variable indicating PE/VC-
backing, as independent variables: {𝐵𝑀 𝑎𝑑𝑗. 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝. ) + 𝛽2(𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎) + 𝛽3(𝑃𝐸/𝑉𝐶) + 𝑢𝑡}. 
We calculate betas for companies that remains active for at 36 months subsequent to the IPO, and include a maximum of 60 
months for any given beta value, to capture the market sensitivity surrounding the IPO event. This leaves us with a sample 
consisting of 46 PE/VC IPOs and 102 NB IPOs, for a total of 148 IPOs.   
 (1) 
 Robust OLS 
Market Capitalization -0.000 
 (0.000)  
t: -0,27 / P > | t |: 0,79  
  
Equity Beta 0.036 
 (0.044) 
t: 0,81 / P > | t |: 0,42 
  
PE/VC dummy -0.073 
 (0.050) 
t: -1,45 / P > | t |: 0,15 
  
Constant 0.070 
 (0.072) 
t: 0,98 / P > | t |: 0,33 
 
N 148.000 
Adj. R2 -0.0125 
  Standard errors in parentheses, t- and p-values below. 
       * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Our original results resemble those of Megginson and Weiss (1991), as the dummy coefficient 
indicate a negative effect of PE/VC involvement on underpricing, although insignificant, 
while simultaneously showing virtually no effect of size. We do not find any effect of risk 
affecting underpricing, as postulated by Levis (2011), for our original sample. The explained 
variance of underpricing by market capitalization, equity betas and the PE/VC-dummy is 
  
80
below zero, displaying an adjusted R2 of -1,2532. The F-test yields an F-value of 0,76 and we 
have to keep the null stating joint insignificance of our explanatory variables. We have 
accounted for the multiple regression model’s assumptions in Appendix 6.1 in several ways; 
the most important one, the zero conditional mean, states that the error term should not 
simultaneously correlate with the dependent and independent variables, which might indicate, 
among other things, an omitted variables bias. Including additional explanatory variables 
might mitigate this problem. The F-test reveals that our explanatory variables are jointly 
insignificant, which indicate we might have an omitted variables bias. We also operate with a 
sub-sample of our full IPO-sample, but cannot find any logical reason for breaching 
assumption three, concerning random sampling. On the other hand, our sample period covers 
two financial crises, which may bias our full IPO-sample, relative to past and future IPOs.   
Regarding the assumption of constant variance (homoskedasticity), the diagnostic plot in 
Appendix 6.2 show that the data probably do not suffer from heteroskedasticity. Despite a 
couple of outliers, the error terms display a shape indicative of constant variance. When 
assessing assumption 6 (normality of residuals), we notice that the extreme initial returns of 
Camposol (413,27 %) and Norwegian Applied Technology (145,92 %) leaves our inference 
invalid, as our density distributions are far from normally distributed (Appendix 6.3). We 
remove these observations, which leaves our residuals resembling approximately normally 
distributed, with the exception of higher density surrounding the mean. When we regress using 
the adjusted sample, we find that the estimated equity betas display a significant and positive 
coefficient33, indicating that riskier issues display higher underpricing (initial returns).  
The remaining explanatory variables’ p-values now increase substantially, still leaving them 
jointly insignificant. The original p-value and the negative direction of the PE/VC-dummy 
coefficient (0,15) indicated that PEs/VCs mitigated underpricing to some extent. However, 
subsequent to the adjustment, the p-value increases to 0,47. It seems our adjusted data supports 
                                                 
32 The adjusted R2 accounts for an increasing number of explanatory variables, as the ordinary R2 always increase when 
adding variables to the model. 𝐴𝑑𝑗. 𝑅2 = 1 −  
𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑟/ 𝑑𝑓𝑒
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑡/𝑑𝑓𝑡
, where 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑟 is the sum of squared error terms, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑡 is the total sum 
of squares, 𝑑𝑓𝑡 is the degrees of freedom 𝑛 − 1 of the population variance, and 𝑑𝑓𝑒  is the degrees of freedom 𝑛 − 𝑝 − 1 of 
the estimate of the underlying population error variance.  
33 𝛽(𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎) = 0,069, with a p-value of 0,02. (t-statistic: 2,36)  
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the notion of risk being the primary factor influencing underpricing, which is consistent with 
the results of Levis (2011).    
5.3 Long-Run Performance 
We use total return index (RI) values from Datastream when calculating the returns of 
individual firms and the OSEBX index, as the RI accounts for capital operations and 
dividends, by assuming reinvestment in each respective equity. The first RI value for each 
company originates from the 1st of the month subsequent to the offering, as we wish to 
calculate long-run performance excluding initial returns, which we highlighted separately in 
section 4.2. We have supplemented the tables below with additional information, where 
appropriate.  
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5.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.6 
Descriptive Statistics of Monthly Abnormal Returns 
We measure monthly, simple34, benchmark-adjusted returns as; [𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = (𝑅𝐼𝑡 − 𝑅𝐼𝑡−1)/𝑅𝐼𝑡−1], where 𝑅𝐼𝑡  equals the total 
return index level in month t and 𝑅𝐼𝑡−1 is the total return index level the previous month. The index values accounts for capital 
operations (e.g. stock splits) and assumes reinvestment of dividends.  We report individual (firm level) stock’s raw35 returns 
independent of life span (i.e. including all returns for all months t), and additionally on an aggregated portfolio level, equally- 
and value-weighted, dependent on life span (i.e. between a minimum of one and a maximum of 60 monthly returns), to capture 
the “IPO-effect”. These portfolios are comprised of returns originating from companies that went public during the five years 
prior to each respective months aggregated return, effectively excluding companies of longer maturities. In the event of 
delistings prior to month t60, we rebalance the portfolios. Our sample data cover return series for 298 NB IPOs and 67 PE/VC-
backed IPOs. We have included the OSEBX returns’ distribution and its normal distribution for the equally- and value-
weighted portfolios to highlight differences. 
 
                                                 
34 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 =  [
(𝑅𝐼𝑡−𝑅𝐼𝑡−1)
𝑅𝐼𝑡−1
], as opposed to  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 =  𝑙𝑛 [
𝑅𝐼𝑡
𝑅𝐼𝑡−1
] 
35 𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 =  [
(𝑅𝐼𝑡−𝑅𝐼𝑡−1)
𝑅𝐼𝑡−1
]  ↔  𝑙𝑛 [
𝑅𝐼𝑡
𝑅𝐼𝑡−1
], as opposed to 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 =  {(𝑙𝑛 [
𝑅𝐼𝑡
𝑅𝐼𝑡−1
]) × 𝑤𝑖  𝑜𝑟 
1
𝑛𝑃
} ↔ {([
(𝑅𝐼𝑡−𝑅𝐼𝑡−1)
𝑅𝐼𝑡−1
] ) × 𝑤𝑖 𝑜𝑟 
1
𝑛𝑃
} 
Raw IPO Returns                                
Firm Level
EW IPO Returns                                      
Portfolio Level
VW IPO Returns                
Portfolio Level
Monthly Simple BM-adj. Returns Monthly Simple BM-adj. Returns Monthly Simple BM-adj. Returns
Minimum -95,96 % -22,40 % -26,44 %
Maximum 189,56 % 27,14 % 30,70 %
Median -1,99 % -0,79 % -0,88 %
Mean -0,32 % -0,19 % -0,69 %
Standard Deviation 17,99 % 6,72 % 8,36 %
Skewness 1,27                                                 0,64                                                 0,73                                                 
Kurtosis 7,71                                                 2,82                                                 2,75                                                 
Raw IPO Returns                                
Firm Level
EW IPO Returns                                      
Portfolio Level
VW IPO Returns                
Portfolio Level
Monthly Simple BM-adj. Returns Monthly Simple BM-adj. Returns Monthly Simple BM-adj. Returns
Minimum -97,89 % -18,84 % -23,50 %
Maximum 730,77 % 12,57 % 15,65 %
Median -1,16 % -0,03 % 0,20 %
Mean -0,06 % 0,03 % 0,10 %
Standard Deviation 19,85 % 5,02 % 4,36 %
Skewness 6,14                                                 -0,38                                                -0,72                                                
Kurtosis 160,96                                             1,68                                                 4,77                                                 
OSEBX Returns                                
Value Weighted Index
Raw IPO Returns                                
Firm Level
EW IPO Returns                                      
Portfolio Level
VW IPO Returns                
Portfolio Level
Monthly Simple Returns Monthly Simple BM-adj. Returns Monthly Simple BM-adj. Returns Monthly Simple BM-adj. Returns
PE/VC
NB
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We include IPOs’ benchmark-adjusted firm-level returns to illustrate the properties of the raw 
data set, while we apply the weighted data sets in the CAR, BHR and risk-adjusted returns’ 
calculations. In the following, we comment on differences between IPO groups, across 
weighting methods. The equally weighted and benchmark-adjusted PE/VC IPO return 
distribution, which proxy for smaller capitalization firms, display a median and mean value 
lower than that of the NB IPOs, at -0,79 % (median) and -0,19 % (mean) compared to -0,03 
% and 0,03 %, respectively. The equally-weighted PE/VC returns’ distribution display a 
marginally higher standard deviation and nearly twice the kurtosis contrasted with the equally-
weighted NB returns’ distribution, indicating more numerous infrequent outliers in the former 
sample. This is natural, as the equally-weighted returns for the NB sample are fractions with 
a larger denominator.  
The value-weighted returns, which proxy for larger capitalization firms, indicate that large 
PE/VC-backed IPOs perform even worse than smaller PE/VC-backed IPOs, returning a 
median and mean of -0,88 % and -0,69 %, respectively. The opposite is true for NB IPOs, as 
the value weighted-portfolio display a mean and median of 0,20 % and 0,10 %, respectively, 
higher than the equally-weighted NB portfolio values. The volatility of the value-weighted 
PE/VC portfolio returns is almost twice the size of the value-weighted NB portfolio, at 8,36 
% versus 4,36 %.  
The OSEBX returns distribution display a mean of 0,95 %, which is significantly higher than 
the equally- and value-weighted PE/VC portfolios, but only borderline significantly different 
from the value-weighted NB IPO portfolios, when applying a significance level of  5%36. We 
test whether any of the portfolios return significant alphas when regressed on the market, both 
using CAPM and multifactor models, in section 4.3.3.  
 
                                                 
36 Two-Sample t-tests, Assuming Unequal Variances, returns the following one-tail t- and p-values with a null hypothesis 
stating that the means of the samples equals the mean of the OSEBX index:  
 
EW PE/VC:  t: 1,6510 / p: 0,0498 
VW PE/VC: t: 2,1158 / p: 0,0175 
EW NB:  t: 1,4899 / p: 0,0686 
VW NB:  t: 1,4507 / p: 0,0739 
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5.3.2 Sponsoring 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Table 4.7 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns in Event Time 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) calculated with monthly rebalancing and the OSEBX as benchmark, for both PE/VC- 
and NB firms, equally- and value-weighted, in event time, over 6 months, 1 year, 3 years and 5 years. We calculate the 
benchmark adjusted abnormal return as: {𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝐵𝑀,𝑡}, where  𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the monthly abnormal return of IPO i, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the 
monthly raw initial return for IPO i and 𝑟𝐵𝑀,𝑡 is the monthly benchmark return. We separate PE/VC- from NB-firms, calculate 
the abnormal returns, and then aggregate the results on a portfolio basis. We calculate the equally-weighted portfolio of 
abnormal returns by adding the abnormal returns of n IPOs during month t: {𝐴𝑅𝑝,𝑡
𝐸𝑊 =  
1
𝑛𝑝
 ∑ 𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑛𝑝
𝑖=1
} , where 𝐴𝑅𝑝,𝑡
𝐸𝑊 is the equally 
weighted abnormal return of portfolio p in month t. The value-weighted portfolio return formula is defined as: 
{𝐴𝑅𝑝,𝑡
𝑉𝑊 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖,𝑡  ×  𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑛𝑝
𝑖=1
}, where 𝑤𝑖,𝑡 is the weight of the stock i in relation to the total size of portfolio p in month t and 𝐴𝑅𝑝,𝑡
𝑉𝑊 
is the value-weighted abnormal return for portfolio p in month t. Market capitalization weights are aligned to the base year of 
2010 using a time-varying GDP deflator. We accumulate both measures separately in event time, regardless of issue date, to 
obtain a CAR for each weighting method: {𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡−𝑇 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 }. 
 
 
The value-weighted portfolio of NB IPOs clearly outperforms all other portfolios, over all 
time horizons, assuming similar relative volatility as the OSEBX. By definition, large NB 
capitalization firms attributes the most towards the observed results, while the largest PE/VC-
backed IPOs performs the worst, which is unconventional, as one usually observes the largest 
deviations for the equally weighted returns37. The difference between the equally-weighted 5-
year CARs is almost neglectable, -113,04 % for PE/VC IPOs and -99,16 % for NB IPOs, a 
difference of 13,88 %. However, Table 4.8 neglects to inform of the short run development of 
the of the value-weighted CAR for the PE/VC IPOs, as it always seems to be worse off than 
that of the NB IPOs. Figure 4.2 illustrates a run up of the CAR until the 18th month, where 
PE/VC IPOs outperforms NB IPOs with a difference of about 20 %. At first glance, this might 
be indicative short-sightedness among PEs/VCs, as postulated in Bergström, Nilsson and 
Wahlberg (2006), characterized by high initial returns with rapidly deteriorating returns in the 
long run, as their ownership stake is gradually reduced. However, we are aware of that some 
                                                 
37 We received information from Professor Thore Johnsen at NHH on this issue.  
Time Horizon 6m CAR 1y CAR 3y CAR 5y CAR 6m CAR 1y CAR 3y CAR 5y CAR
Equally-Weighted -6,23 % -21,01 % -63,68 % -113,04 % -8,90 % -17,16 % -61,07 % -99,16 %
Value-Weighted -5,45 % -4,05 % -59,67 % -150,47 % -4,09 % 1,84 % -11,01 % -14,11 %
PE/VC NB
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companies were listed with abnormally high market capitalization, which might distort the 
results of the value-weighted CAR, if their development deviates substantially from that of the 
average company. Below, in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3, we have graphed the CARs’ 
development both using original - and adjusted data, applying trimmed portfolios.  
Table 4.8 
Trimmed Cumulative Abnormal Returns in Event Time 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) calculated with monthly rebalancing and the OSEBX as benchmark, for both PE/VC- 
and NB firms, equally- and value-weighted, in event time, over 6 months, 1 year, 3 years and 5 years. We apply symmetrical 
trimming to all portfolios, which involves removing 5 % of the firms exhibiting extreme CARs, 2,5 % from each tail of the 
distribution. Each individual firm’s weighted CAR is calculated as: {𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡−𝑇
𝑉𝑊 = ∑ [𝑤𝑖,𝑡  ×  𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡]
 
 }, for the VW portfolio, and as: 
{𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡−𝑇
𝐸𝑊 = ∑ [
1
𝑛𝑝
 ×  𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡]
 
 } for the EW portfolio through the full sample period of 60 months (cf. section 3.1.2 for notation 
details). Prior to aggregating on portfolio level, we remove the four firms from the PE/VC sample and the 16 firms from the 
NB sample (50 % in each tail) that exhibit the highest and lowest CARs. Subsequently, we recalculate the remaining returns 
according to new weights/fractions, and accumulate the CARs across the predefined time-horizons.   
 
Subsequent to trimming, the value-weighted NB portfolio still outperforms all other portfolios, 
in all periods, though relatively less substantial. The value-weighted portfolios convergences 
considerably while the difference between the equally-weighted portfolios is only slightly 
reduced. The difference in 5-year value-weighted CARs narrows from 136,36 % (-150,47 % 
- (-14,11 %) to 77,04 % (-134,07 % - (-57,03 %)), and the steep surge of the value-weighted 
PE/VC CAR up until t18 completely disappears, displayed in Figure 4.3. The stippled lines 
shows the development of the original value-weighted CARs, while we have trimmed the 
others for outliers. The dotted blue line emphasizes the substantial impact of including firms 
with extreme CARs, among them; Renewable Energy Corporation, which entered the stock 
exchange with a market capitalization of 66 billion NOK (deflated), and displayed a highly 
volatile development. Statoil, among others, contributed substantially to the value-weighted 
NB sample, with its 220 billion NOK (deflated) IPO marked capitalization and subsequently 
high returns, displayed by the stippled brown line in Figure 4.3. 
   
 
Time Horizon 6m CAR 1y CAR 3y CAR 5y CAR 6m CAR 1y CAR 3y CAR 5y CAR
Equally-Weighted -8,03 % -21,86 % -59,00 % -99,64 % -8,52 % -17,31 % -56,11 % -89,38 %
Value-Weighted -15,75 % -36,52 % -85,55 % -134,07 % -7,85 % -12,05 % -24,30 % -57,03 %
PE/VC NB
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Figure 4.2 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns in Event Time 
CARs are calculated applying monthly rebalancing and excluding initial returns, adjusted for the OSEBX return during the 
same period, equally and value weighted, over a maximum of 60 months. We align market capitalization weights to the base 
year of 2010 using a GDP deflator, and accumulate both measures separately in event time, regardless of issue date, to obtain 
a CAR for each weighting method. Cf. Table 4.7.  
 
Figure 4.3 
Analysis of Trimmed Cumulative Abnormal Returns in Event Time 
The graph displays trimmed cumulative abnormal returns for PE/VC IPO- and NB IPO portfolios in event time. We apply 
symmetrical trimming to all portfolios, which involves removing 5 % of the firms exhibiting extreme CARs, 2,5 % from each 
tail of the distribution. Each individual firm’s weighted CAR is calculated as: {𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡−𝑇
𝑉𝑊 = ∑ [𝑤𝑖,𝑡  ×  𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡]
 
 }, for the VW portfolio, 
and as: {𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡−𝑇
𝐸𝑊 = ∑ [
1
𝑛𝑝
 ×  𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡]
 
 } for the EW portfolio through the full sample period of 60 months (cf. section 3.1.2 for notation 
details). Prior to aggregating on portfolio level, we remove the four firms from the PE/VC sample and the 16 firms from the 
NB sample (50 % in each tail) that exhibit the highest and lowest CARs. Subsequently, we recalculate the remaining returns 
according to new weights/fractions, and accumulate the CARs across the full 60 months period. Cf. Table 4.8. 
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On average, REC inflicts a market capitalization weight of 39,22% on the value-weighted 
PE/VC portfolio returns over the full 60 months timespan. Statoil’s average sample period 
weight (27,40%), also distort the results of the NB portfolio, given the relatively infrequent 
flotations of firms of similar size. None of the portfolios outperforms the OSEBX index, 
displayed by the black full line running from the origin, but we observe that there is only a 
marginal difference between the index and the unadjusted value weighted NB portfolio. The 
main reason for this alignment is that they to some extent resemble each other, as the OSEBX 
is constructed as a value-weighted index containing the largest and most liquid companies 
listed at the OSE38. Large market capitalization companies as Statoil is heavily represented in 
the OSEBX (IPO date from 2001), which ensures that the value-weighted NB portfolio’s CAR 
covariates and evolves in the same pattern as the OSEBX.  
For IPOs in general, our calculations partly aligns with those of Ritter (1991) and Loughran 
and Ritter (1995), as the equally weighted CARs displays severely worse performance than 
the value weighted CAR of NB IPOs, indicating that large capitalization firms outperform 
small capitalization firms, typically young growth firms. However, the value-weighted PE/VC 
CAR does not fit this description, as it indicates even worse performance among large 
capitalization PE/VC-backed IPOs than for any of the other portfolios. Our results directly 
oppose those of Bergström, Nilsson, and Wahlberg (2006) and Levis (2011), as we find 
marked worse performance among large PE/VC IPOs relative to all other IPOs, and poorer 
performance by smaller PE/VC issues relative to the remaining groups (NB EW and NB VW). 
On the other hand, our absolute sample size and the relative composition of PE and VC firms 
within the PE/VC sample, makes it difficult to distinguish between the two groups, which in 
turn renders their results less comparable to ours.  
Our results also contradicts the findings of Brav and Gompers (1997), as they find 
underperformance of smaller NB firms relative to smaller VC firms, which in turn is 
                                                 
38 The OSEBX is an investable index that aim at containing a representative sample of all listed shares on the OSE. OSE 
audits the OSEBX on a semi-annual basis and implement changes on December 1. and June 1. The securities are free-float 
adjusted, accounting for the proportion of a listed firm that is publically traded. In the period between revision dates, the 
number of shares for each index member is held fixed, excluding capital-adjustments dilutive to existing shareholders. The 
OSEBX is dividend-adjusted. As of 26 March 2013 consists of 55 companies, but during our sample period the number of 
included companies varies from 52 to 81.  
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substantially decreased when applying value-weighting. We find the direct opposite; the 
equally weighted NB portfolio performs marginally better than the equally weighted PE/VC 
portfolio, while the difference widens, rather than narrows when value-weighting returns. 
Further, the value-weighted NB portfolio outperforms all other portfolios, both before and 
after trimming. Below, we replicate the methodology applied in Ritter (1991) when calculating 
t-statistics for the CAR calculations. The null hypothesis states equal CARs for the market and 
each respective IPO portfolio.     
Table 4.9 
t-tests: Equally-Weighted Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Initial Public 
Offerings in the Period of 1996 to 2010 
The equally weighted portfolios’ abnormal returns (𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝐸𝑊) and cumulative abnormal returns 𝐶𝐴𝑅1,𝑡 in percent, with associated 
t-statistics for the 60 months after going public (excluding initial returns). {𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝐸𝑊 =  
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑛𝑝
𝑖=1
} , where 𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the benchmark-
adjusted abnormal return in month 𝑡. The t-statistics for the equally weighted abnormal return for month t is computed for 
each month as: {𝐴𝑅𝑡 ∗ √𝑛𝑡/𝑠𝑑𝑡}, where 𝐴𝑅𝑡 is the equally weighted abnormal return for month t, 𝑛𝑡  is the number of 
observations in month t, and 𝑠𝑑𝑡  is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the adjusted returns for month t. The t-statistic 
for the cumulative abnormal return in month t, 𝐶𝐴𝑅1,𝑡  , is computed as: {𝐶𝐴𝑅1,𝑡 ∗ √𝑛𝑡/𝑐𝑠𝑑𝑡}, where 𝑛𝑡  is the number of firms 
trading in each month, and 𝑐𝑠𝑑𝑡  is computed as: {𝑐𝑠𝑑𝑡 = [𝑡 ∗ 𝑣𝑎𝑟 + 2(𝑡 − 1) ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑣]
1
2}, where 𝑡 is the event month, 𝑣𝑎𝑟 is the 
average (over 60 months) cross-sectional variance, and 𝑐𝑜𝑣 is the first-order autocovariance of the ARt series. The samples 
originates from the calculations described in Table 4.7 and 4.8. 
 
 
Both equally weighted portfolios performs significantly worse than the index, PE/VC IPOs by 
the first year, and NB IPOs by the first month (assuming critical t-value ≈ 2). However, the 
different sample sizes affect the t-statistics so that it seems like PE/VC IPOs display better 
short-run performance. However, as Figure 4.2 also illustrates, both groups share an almost 
identical development in CARs over time, both in the short- and long-run. Over the full sample 
Month of 
seasoning
Number of 
firms trading ARt % t -stat CARt % t -stat
Month of 
seasoning
Number of 
firms trading ARt % t -stat CARt % t -stat
1 67 -0,09 % -0,05 -0,09 % -0,04 1 298 -2,78 % -3,37 -2,78 % -2,60
6 66 -0,50 % -0,23 -6,23 % -1,15 6 291 -2,10 % -1,87 -8,90 % -3,36
12 65 -3,56 % -2,37 -21,01 % -2,72 12 274 -2,84 % -2,32 -17,16 % -4,44
36 48 -2,16 % -1,00 -63,68 % -4,09 36 198 -2,84 % -2,66 -61,07 % -7,76
60 36 -4,48 % -2,09 -113,04 % -4,87 60 161 -2,44 % -2,06 -99,16 % -8,80
PE/VC Equally-weighted NB Equally-weighted
Month of 
seasoning
Number of 
firms trading ARt % t -stat CARt % t -stat
Month of 
seasoning
Number of 
firms trading ARt % t -stat CARt % t -stat
1 63 0,06 % 0,03 0,06 % 0,03 1 282 -2,85 % -3,39 -2,85 % -2,69
6 62 -1,08 % -0,51 -8,03 % -1,48 6 275 -1,99 % -1,70 -8,52 % -3,24
12 61 -3,63 % -2,29 -21,86 % -2,82 12 258 -2,35 % -2,01 -17,31 % -4,51
36 45 -2,34 % -1,05 -59,00 % -3,78 36 184 -2,12 % -2,09 -56,11 % -7,13
60 35 -4,47 % -2,03 -99,64 % -4,36 60 152 -2,66 % -2,16 -89,38 % -8,00
PE/VC Equally-weighted (trimmed) NB Equally-weighted (trimmed)
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period of 60 months, both portfolios return significant t-values, and we reject the null 
hypothesis stating equal CARs for the market and the two portfolios. The t-tests for the 
trimmed samples yields similar results. 
Table 4.10 
t-tests: Value-Weighted Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Initial Public 
Offerings in the Period of 1996 to 2010 
The value weighted portfolio abnormal return (𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑉𝑊) and cumulative abnormal returns 𝐶𝐴𝑅1,𝑡 in percent, with associated t-
statistics for the 60 months after going public (excluding initial returns). {𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑉𝑊 =  ∑ 𝑤𝑖 × 𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑛𝑝
𝑖=1
} , where 𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the benchmark 
adjusted abnormal return in month 𝑡. The t-statistics for the value weighted abnormal return for month t is computed for each 
month as {𝐴𝑅𝑡 ∗ √𝑛𝑡/𝑠𝑑𝑡}, where 𝐴𝑅𝑡 is the value weighted abnormal return for month t, 𝑛𝑡  is the number of observations in 
month t, and 𝑠𝑑𝑡  is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the adjusted returns for month t. The t-statistic for the cumulative 
abnormal return in month t, 𝐶𝐴𝑅1,𝑡  , is computed as {𝐶𝐴𝑅1,𝑡 ∗ √𝑛𝑡/𝑐𝑠𝑑𝑡}, where 𝑛𝑡  is the number of firms trading in each month, 
and 𝑐𝑠𝑑𝑡  is computed as {𝑐𝑠𝑑𝑡 = [𝑡 ∗ 𝑣𝑎𝑟 + 2(𝑡 − 1) ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑣]
1
2}, where 𝑡 is the event month, 𝑣𝑎𝑟 is the average (over 60 months) 
cross-sectional variance, and 𝑐𝑜𝑣 is the first-order autocovariance of the ARt series. The samples originates from the 
calculations described in Table 4.7 and 4.8. 
 
 
Table 4.10 reflects the development displayed in Figure 4.2 and 4.3. The PE/VC sample 
significantly underperforms the market within 3 years, while the NB sample does not seem to 
underperform during the full sample period of 60 months. However, the trimmed samples 
reveal significant underperformance of both IPO groups by the first 6 months, though 
pronouncedly worse for the PE/VC sample. The original run-up during the first year has 
disappeared, and the trimmed, largest PE/VC IPOs display the poorest performance over all 
periods, across all portfolios. Subsequent to trimming the value-weighted NB sample, it also 
display significant underperformance relative to the index. The estimated CARs for all 
Month of 
seasoning
Number of 
firms trading ARt % t -stat CARt % t -stat
Month of 
seasoning
Number of 
firms trading ARt % t -stat CARt % t -stat
1 67 -2,19 % -1,15 -2,19 % -0,99 1 298 -0,27 % -0,32 -0,27 % -0,25
6 66 0,57 % 0,27 -5,45 % -1,00 6 291 -2,68 % -2,39 -4,09 % -1,55
12 65 0,70 % 0,47 -4,05 % -0,52 12 274 -0,76 % -0,62 1,84 % 0,48
36 48 -1,79 % -0,83 -59,67 % -3,83 36 198 -2,49 % -2,34 -11,01 % -1,40
60 36 -14,56 % -6,80 -150,47 % -6,47 60 161 0,38 % 0,32 -14,11 % -1,26
PE/VC Value-weighted NB Value-weighted
Month of 
seasoning
Number of 
firms trading ARt % t -stat CARt % t -stat
Month of 
seasoning
Number of 
firms trading ARt % t -stat CARt % t -stat
1 63 -1,87 % -0,95 -1,87 % -0,83 1 282 -0,68 % -0,82 -0,68 % -0,62
6 62 -3,10 % -1,39 -15,75 % -2,84 6 275 -2,44 % -2,17 -7,85 % -2,89
12 61 -3,98 % -2,53 -36,52 % -4,62 12 259 -3,11 % -2,42 -12,05 % -3,05
36 44 -2,70 % -1,21 -85,55 % -5,31 36 187 -1,08 % -0,98 -24,30 % -3,02
60 34 -4,55 % -2,37 -134,07 % -5,67 60 155 -0,94 % -0,78 -57,03 % -5,00
NB Value-weighted (trimmed)PE/VC Value-weighted (trimmed)
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portfolios, except the unadjusted value-weighted NB portfolio, indicate statistically- and 
economically significant long-run underperformance, relative to the OSEBX index.     
Buy-and-Hold Returns 
Table 4.11 
PE/VC-Backed IPOs’ Buy-and-Hold Returns and Wealth Relatives 
PE/VC BHRs calculated in calendar time over 6 months, 1 year, 3 years and 5 years with corresponding wealth relatives, 
indicating whether the yearly IPO cohorts outperformed the OSEBX index during the same period. The BHRs are defined as: 
𝑅𝑝,𝑇 =  ∏  
𝑇
𝑡=1 (1 + 𝑟𝑝,𝑡), where 𝑅𝑝,𝑇 is the portfolio’s BHR measured without the initial returns, from the first month 
subsequent to the year of the offering, over time T, and 𝑟𝑝,𝑡 is the sum of the portfolio firms’ returns in month t. We invest a 
value-weighted share in each IPO at the first trading day subsequent to the year of flotation and redistribute the value amount 
according to each IPOs relative weight when a firm delists, while rebalancing monthly. We then divide the BHRs of the 
PE/VC and NB IPO portfolios by the BHR of the OSEBX, accumulated through the same period in time, to compute Wealth 
Relatives: {𝑊𝑅𝑝,𝑇 =  
𝑅𝑝,𝑇
𝑅𝐵𝑀,𝑇
}, where 𝑅𝐵𝑀,𝑇 is the BHR of the OSEBX. A WR < 1 indicate that portfolio p underperformed the 
market, while a WR > 1 indicate that portfolio p outperformed the market. 
 
As previously mentioned, the BHR calculations for PE/VC IPOs may not be reliable, as the 
small sample size leaves the impression that most years’ BHRs/WRs display arbitrary values, 
invalidating generalization and comparisons39. However, our data set is given, and the BHR 
calculations should be viewed as a supplement to the CAR- and risk-adjusted returns 
                                                 
39 E.g. 2009 displays zero listing backed by PE/VC, while the remaining years experience few and varying samples sizes. For 
2010 we only include BHRs and WRs for 6 months and 1 year, as 31.12.2013 lies ahead.  
Year N 6 m 1 y 3 y 5 y 6 m 1 y 3 y 5 y
1996 2 -7,73 % 28,30 % -14,64 % 16,72 % 0,74          0,97          0,59          0,92          
1997 6 -12,85 % -66,30 % 160,22 % -95,28 % 0,84          0,46          2,33          0,07          
1998 4 58,85 % 109,97 % 31,75 % 54,96 % 1,30          1,39          1,01          1,16          
1999 2 30,50 % -12,74 % -83,86 % -65,33 % 1,27          0,86          0,27          0,28          
2000 6 -41,88 % -38,25 % -60,07 % -35,23 % 0,59          0,72          0,46          0,38          
2001 2 2,35 % -24,21 % -9,99 % -2,56 % 1,14          1,10          0,63          0,37          
2002 2 86,49 % 199,61 % 319,70 % 68,55 % 1,62          2,02          1,45          0,40          
2003 1 11,11 % 78,22 % 189,99 % 189,99 % 0,92          1,28          1,13          2,20          
2004 8 14,13 % 62,25 % 35,74 % 49,26 % 0,95          1,16          0,66          0,96          
2005 15 40,91 % 56,19 % -15,85 % 99,96 % 1,23          1,18          1,24          1,50          
2006 7 91,99 % 125,21 % -55,76 % -92,35 % 1,66          2,02          0,52          0,09          
2007 8 -21,91 % -48,01 % -34,14 % -42,16 % 0,84          1,13          0,73          0,64          
2008 1 50,03 % 47,52 % 220,90 % - 1,17          0,90          1,86          -
2009 0 - - - - - - - -
2010 3 -21,31 % -51,60 % - - 0,82          0,55          - -
Wealth RelativesBuy-and-Hold Returns
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calculations. We comment in detail on differences between IPO segments where the yearly 
cohorts’ wealth relatives differ substantially, especially when they move in opposite 
directions. Figure 4.4 below, where we graph the temporal development of each IPO groups’ 
periodic wealth relative, illustrates the results of both Table 4.11 and 4.12, in a comparative 
manner.  
Table 4.12 
NB IPOs’ Buy-and-Hold Returns and Wealth Relatives 
NB BHRs calculated in calendar time over 6 months, 1 year, 3 years and 5 years with corresponding wealth relatives, 
indicating whether the yearly IPO cohorts outperformed the OSEBX index during the same period. The BHRs are defined as: 
𝑅𝑝,𝑇 =  ∏  
𝑇
𝑡=1 (1 + 𝑟𝑝,𝑡), where 𝑅𝑝,𝑇 is the portfolio’s BHR measured without the initial returns, from the first month 
subsequent to the year of the offering, over time T, and 𝑟𝑝,𝑡 is the sum of the portfolio firms’ returns in month t. We invest a 
value-weighted share in each IPO at the first trading day subsequent to the year of flotation and redistribute the value amount 
according to each IPOs relative weight when a firm is delisted, and rebalance monthly. We then divide the BHRs of the 
PE/VC and NB IPO portfolios by the BHR of the OSEBX, accumulated through the same period in time, to compute Wealth 
Relatives: {𝑊𝑅𝑝,𝑇 =  
𝑅𝑝,𝑇
𝑅𝐵𝑀,𝑇
}, where 𝑅𝐵𝑀,𝑇 is the BHR of the OSEBX. A WR < 1 indicate that portfolio p underperformed the 
market, while a WR > 1 indicate that portfolio p outperformed the market. 
 
Among the short-run wealth relatives of 6 months and 1 year, we observe the largest deviations 
between the yearly cohorts of 2002 and 2006, where PE/VC IPOs perform well above the 
aggregate market, while NB IPOs return marginally less. Both groups exhibit few offerings 
during 2002, two for the PE/VC-backed sample and three for the NB sample, while there were 
floated 7 PE/VC IPOs and 25 NB IPOs during 2006. During 2002, Q-Free and Apptix went 
public in the auspices of Televenture Management and Convexa Capital, respectively, while 
Year N 6 m 1 y 3 y 5 y 6 m 1 y 3 y 5 y
1996 20 28,18 % 65,88 % 90,05 % 95,68 % 1,03          1,25          1,31          1,55          
1997 51 11,33 % -15,15 % -3,37 % -61,53 % 1,07          1,16          0,86          0,58          
1998 23 22,78 % 54,27 % 56,74 % 54,32 % 1,01          1,02          1,20          1,15          
1999 8 29,59 % -57,34 % -95,77 % -91,16 % 1,26          0,42          0,07          0,07          
2000 22 -3,31 % -6,21 % -2,92 % 55,17 % 0,98          1,10          1,11          0,91          
2001 15 7,99 % -5,45 % 66,97 % 223,69 % 1,21          1,37          1,17          1,23          
2002 3 -0,18 % 45,57 % 373,80 % 613,14 % 0,86          0,98          1,64          1,67          
2003 3 -28,38 % -32,36 % 42,77 % -53,05 % 0,59          0,49          0,55          0,36          
2004 14 40,73 % 73,92 % 270,79 % 182,19 % 1,17          1,24          1,80          1,81          
2005 30 20,14 % 43,51 % -16,24 % 160,70 % 1,04          1,09          1,24          1,96          
2006 25 13,72 % -4,84 % -45,46 % -62,60 % 0,98          0,85          0,65          0,42          
2007 49 -8,73 % -60,84 % -25,16 % -13,52 % 0,98          0,85          0,83          0,96          
2008 15 25,38 % 24,58 % 60,67 % - 0,98          0,76          0,93          -
2009 3 -24,77 % 22,90 % 88,08 % - 0,88          1,03          1,57          -
2010 17 4,65 % -9,89 % - - 1,06          1,06          - -
Wealth RelativesBuy-and-Hold Returns
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Subsea 7, Birdstep Technology and Lerøy Seafood Group form the development of the 2002-
cohort for the NB sample. All companies, in both samples, remain active through the full five-
year measurement period subsequent to the offering. The vastly differing values between the 
2006-cohorts, where the PE/VC portfolio outperform the market by a factor of 2 during the 
first year, while the NB portfolio performs slightly worse than the market, originates from the 
run-up of the large market capitalization firm, REC. The hype surrounding REC lasted for 
approximately 20 months, before the stock ultimately plummeted, which characterize the 
long-run WRs, measured over three and five years, of 0,52 and 0,09, respectively.  
Figure 4.4 
Development in Wealth Relatives for PE/VC and NB IPOs across time 
The graphs display the development in wealth relatives for both groups of IPOs over 6 months, 1 year, 3 years and 5 years. 
The wealth relative is defined as: 𝑊𝑅𝑝,𝑇 = (𝑅𝑝,𝑇/𝑅𝐵𝑀,𝑇), where 𝑅𝑝,𝑇 is the BHR in calendar time of IPOs floated in year T, 
and  𝑅𝐵𝑀,𝑇 is the BHR of the OSEBX during the same period. A wealth relative above one indicate that the cohort of IPOs 
outperformed the OSEBX, while a wealth relative below one indicate that the IPOs underperformed the OSEBX.    
 
Arguing whether or not the underlying management fund, Hafslund Venture, contributed 
towards the hype surrounding the IPO of REC (e.g. marketing) is beyond the scope of our 
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thesis, but the observed difference is unlikely to have arisen due to superior management 
skill40.  
The PE/VC IPOs floated during 1997 exhibit a peculiar aggregated development in the after-
market, characterized by worse performance than both the index and the NB IPO portfolio in 
the short-term, while the 3-year BHR surges, prior to declining drastically after 5 years. The 
index performs poorly during 1998, experiencing a drop of nearly 50 %, but the PE/VC-backed 
firms CorrOcean, Iterated Systems and Navis, with an initial accumulated market weight of 
65 % performs even worse. This explains the poor performance in the short-run, while the 
development of the 3- and 5-year BHRs is mainly attributable to Marine Harvest, which 
experienced a tenfold increase in its stock price, which peaked in August of 2000. As a 
consequence of the collapsing market price for salmon in 2001, the stock price declined well 
below the IPO price within the end of 2002, biasing both the perceived long-run over- and 
underperformance of the portfolio. In other words, market dynamics seems to have affected 
the development of the PE/VC-backed IPOs floated in 1997, rather than various PE/VC-
attributes.    
The difference between the 2003-cohorts stands out as pronounced for both the short- and 
long-run BHRs, arising from the acquisition of NextGenTel Holding by the Swedish telecom 
firm TeliaSonera in 2006. NextGenTel is the only company in the PE/VC portfolio for 2003. 
It remained listed for nearly three years, and ultimately supplied initial investors with a BHR 
of 190 %. 
The remaining wealth relatives measured over three- and five years often display similar 
values across IPO segment. We have explained why PE/VC IPOs have overperformed NB 
IPOs, which often arise due to general market dynamics, rather than the claimed attributes of 
active management funds. Figure 4.4 indicate that PE/VC IPOs supply marginally higher 
BHRs in the short term, while relatively underperforming both the market and NB IPOs in the 
long-run. PE/VC IPOs 6-month and 1-year WRs exceeds those of NB IPOs in 7 and 8 out of 
                                                 
40 As we point out under section 3.1.2, portfolios comprised of equally weighted returns might proxy for management skill if 
they outperform the market or another group of IPOs. However, the clear dominance of REC in the value weighted portfolio, 
both in terms of market capitalization and abnormally high short-term returns, resemble a financial bubble rather than a result 
of superior management skill. 
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14 observed years, respectively, while the 3- and 5-year WRs only exceed those of NB WRs 
in 5 and 2 years out of 13 and 12 available yearly observations, respectively. Average 6-month 
and 1-year WRs equal 1,01 and 0,98 for NB IPOs, respectively, while they are somewhat 
higher for PE/VC IPOs, at 1,08 and 1,12, reflecting relatively better short term performance 
of PE/VC IPOs. 3-year and 5-year WRs equals 1,07 and 1,06 for NB IPOs, while declining to 
0,99 and 0,75 for PE/VC IPOs, thereby unveiling similar long-run performance patterns as 
those found in the CAR calculations. 
 
5.3.3 Market Capitalization and Risk 
Table 4.13 
Monthly Risk-Adjusted Returns 
We calculate risk-adjusted returns using monthly, calendar time, simple portfolio returns. We aggregate the returns of all 
active IPO firms, in each respective group, that were listed in the five years previous to the month of the observation, equally- 
and value weighted. We exclude firms that remain active for longer than five year subsequent to the IPO, enabling us to 
measure the risk-adjusted return related to the IPO. Panel A display the risk-adjusted returns for the portfolio of PE/VC IPOs, 
using CAPM {𝑟𝑝,𝑡
𝐸𝑊/𝑉𝑊 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑝 (𝑟𝑀,𝑡 −  𝑟𝑓,𝑡) +  𝑢𝑡}, Fama and French three factor model {𝑟𝑝,𝑡
𝐸𝑊/𝑉𝑊 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼 +
 𝛽𝑝 (𝑟𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) +  𝑠
(𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡) + ℎ(𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡) + 𝑢𝑡} and the Fama and French extended model, including liquidity and momentum 
{𝑟𝑝,𝑡
𝐸𝑊/𝑉𝑊 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑝(𝑟𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝑠(𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡) + ℎ(𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡) + [ 𝑙(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡) + 𝑚(𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡)] + 𝑢𝑡}. We estimate the models using all 
199 monthly observations. Panel B displays the same procedure using NB IPOs portfolio returns, while Panel C regress on 
the excess returns of the PE/VC IPO portfolio over the NB IPO portfolio. We calculate risk-adjusted returns using equity- 
rather than asset betas, as it is argued in Fama and French (1992) that the combination of size- and value-factors absorbs the 
apparent roles of leverage in average stock returns. For the CAPM regressions, our betas incorporates the effect of leverage. 
We have corrected the coefficients’ standard errors for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using Newey-West (NW) 
standard errors, and tested for unit root by applying Dickey-Fuller-tests; we are unable to detect any highly persistent time-
series.  
 
CAPMEW CAPMVW FF3EW FF3VW FF5EW FF5VW
α -0.005 0.006 -0.008 -0.008 -0.005 -0.009
(0.007) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
βRMRF 0.913*** 1.079*** 0.797*** 0.956*** 0.862*** 0.878***
(0.064) (0.077) (0.071) (0.087) (0.073) (0.129)
SMB 0.121*** 0.098* 0.129*** 0.108*
(0.041) (0.058) (0.042) (0.058)
HML -0.339* -0.408* -0.364* -0.426*
(0.179) (0.218) (0.185) (0.228)
LIQ 0.188 -0.122
(0.221) (0.314)
UMD -0.099 -0.236**
(0.078) (0.092)
Months 199 199 199 199 199 199
Adj. R
2
0.533 0.502 0.569 0.530 0.577 0.544
Panel A: PE/VC IPOs
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We obtained the Fama and French HML factor from Bernt Arne Ødegaard, who supply 
empirics on the OSE available from his webpage (domain belonging to the University of 
Stavanger41), while substituting the SMB factor by creating a long-short portfolio of the 
OSESX and OBX, respectively42. The liquidity and momentum factors originates from 
Ødegaards’ calculations. We use local Fama and Franch factors, as Griffin (2002) finds they 
                                                 
41 http://finance.bi.no/~bernt/financial_data/ose_asset_pricing_data/index.html 
42 After discussing the issue with Professor Thore Johnsen at NHH, we proxy for the SMB factor applying the difference 
between the OSESX and the OBX index, as MSCI applies a similar approach in evaluating the active management of the 
Norwegian government pension fund. The OSESX is a total return index consisting of the 10 % lowest capitalized stocks, 
while the OBX is comprised by the 25 most liquid stocks in the OSE Benchmark index (OSEBX) as measured by six-month 
trading volume.  
CAPMEW CAPMVW FF3EW FF3VW FF5EW FF5VW
α -0.004 -0.000 -0.006 0.000 0.000 0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
βRMRF 0.873*** 0.955*** 0.788*** 0.983*** 0.935*** 1.040***
(0.043) (0.048) (0.047) (0.049) (0.051) (0.048)
SMB 0.110*** -0.062* 0.118*** -0.064*
(0.042) (0.037) (0.041) (0.038)
HML -0.148 -0.066 -0.178 -0.066
(0.121) (0.083) (0.128) (0.085)
LIQ 0.367*** 0.116
(0.132) (0.094)
UMD -0.015 0.075
(0.049) (0.057)
Months 199 199 199 199 199 199
Adj. R
2
0.658 0.746 0.677 0.750 0.695 0.755
Panel B: NB IPOs
CAPMEW CAPMVW FF3EW FF3VW FF5EW FF5VW
α -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.009 -0.005 -0.011
(0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.009)
βRMRF 0.040 0.113 0.009 -0.027 -0.073 -0.162
(0.039) (0.093) (0.043) (0.098) (0.067) (0.159)
SMB 0.010 0.160** 0.011 0.173**
(0.043) (0.066) (0.043) (0.068)
HML -0.191* -0.342* -0.187* -0.360
(0.100) (0.204) (0.106) (0.224)
LIQ -0.179 -0.239
(0.149) (0.334)
UMD -0.084 -0.311**
(0.067) (0.125)
Months 199 199 199 199 199 199
Adj. R
2
0.003 0.009 0.028 0.028 0.044 0.099
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Panel C: PE/VC - NB IPOs
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are country-specific, hence local factors better explain time-series variation in stock returns 
than the global factors calculated at Kenneth Frenchs’ website.  
We test the regression models for autocorrelation (Appendix 6.7) and use Newey-West 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-corrected standard errors to validate inference, 
according to the Newey and West (1987) procedure. We also transform the models using 
Cochrane-Orcutt and Prais-Winsten43 to observe whether the resulting estimators deviate 
substantially from the OLS models’ estimates, which might indicate spurious results (e.g. unit 
root/highly persistent time-series). We observe no such deviations, and the Dickey-Fuller44 
tests confirm the absence of unit root in our data-series (Appendix 6.8). The time-series does 
not seem to suffer from trending data, as the added linear trends returns insignificant 
coefficients.  
Panel A) PE/VC IPOs 
PE/VC IPOs’ alpha estimates vary across the different models, almost consistently returning 
negative values, though statistically insignificant. The models we apply, return annualized 
alphas ranging from -10,8 % to 7,2 %45. While both portfolios return insignificant alphas using 
conventional significance levels, the equally-weighted portfolio borders at significance on a 
10 % level with a p-value of 10,2 % and an annualized alpha of -9,6 % (FF3EW). The market 
factor decreases as the factor loadings of SMB and HML returns significant coefficients for 
both portfolios in the three- and five-factor models, indicating a positive tilt towards small 
capitalization firms, and a negative tilt towards high book-to-market capitalization firms, 
relative to the OSEBX. This is consistent with common characteristics of sectors that PEs/VCs 
usually engage in, such as IT, cleantech and life sciences. In addition, large PE/VC IPOs seems 
                                                 
43 Both Cochrane-Orcutt and Prais-Winsten transformations, are methods of estimating multiple linear regression models with 
Auto Regressive Processes of Order One [AR(1): a time-series model whose current value depends linearly on its most recent 
values plus an unpredictable error term] errors and strictly exogenous explanatory variables. However, unlike Prais-Winsten, 
Cochrane-Orcutt does not use the equation for the first time-period. With large sample sizes, there is little difference between 
them, but as our samples are small, we choose to apply both.  
44 Dickey-Fuller Test: t test of the unit root null hypothesis in an AR(1) model. Unit root is a highly persistent time-series 
process where the current value equals last period’s, plus a weakly dependent disturbance.  
45 We multiply the monthly alpha by 12 to attain the annualized equivalent.  
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to have a significant negative tilt towards momentum, on a 5 % level, indicating fewer past 
“winners” for the PE/VC portfolio than for the index (FF5VW).   
Estimating a model over the full sample period, yields market factors for both portfolios below 
1 (FF5), though not significantly different, which becomes clear when we estimate rolling 
regressions using an expanding window. However, when applying rolling regressions with an 
overlapping, moving window to capture time-variety, PE/VC IPOs seems to exhibit less than 
full market exposure during both financial crises, and significantly so for large firms during 
the subprime lending crisis (Figure 4.6). It is particularly interesting to observe how the 
expanding window regressions display a shift from an upward- to a downward trend in the 
market exposure subsequent to 2008 (Figure 4.5).  
Figure 4.5 
PE/VC IPOs Market Exposure; Rolling Model with Expanding Window 
The graphs display the development of PE/VC IPOs aggregate excess market exposure when applying an initial window of 
24 months, and then expanding the window by one month for each observation, using the extended Fama and French model. 
We have subtracted 1 from the beta estimates, to make the origin indicate the threshold for full market exposure. The stippled 
lines represent 95 % confidence bands (2 standard errors).           
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Figure 4.6 
PE/VC IPOs Market Exposure; Rolling Model with Moving Window 
The graphs display the development of PE/VC IPOs aggregate excess market exposure when applying an initial window of 
24 months, and then moving the window by one month for each observation, capturing the time-variation of market exposure. 
We use the extended Fama and French model. We have subtracted 1 from the beta estimates, to make the origin indicate the 
threshold for full market exposure. The stippled lines represent 95 % confidence bands (2 standard errors).            
 
The negative market exposure during 2004/2005 might have contributed to the observed 
PE/VC poor long-run performance, as this period experienced favourable equity returns. 
While we failed to find significant alphas for any of the portfolios when using the full sample 
period, we find time-varying alphas significantly different from zero, displayed in Figure 4.7 
and 4.8. Both large, and small PE/VC-backed firms, seems to have struggled in providing 
excess returns subsequent to both financial crises, while more pronouncedly so for large 
capitalization firms. Large firms also drifted towards a borderline positive and significant 
alpha towards the market peak in 2008, most likely due to RECs evolvement prior to the 
financial crisis, while small firms drifted in the opposite direction. 
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Figure 4.7 
PE/VC IPOs Equally-Weighted Time-Varying Alpha Estimates 
The graphs display the development in PE/VC IPOs time-varying alpha estimates using the extended Fama and French-model 
on equally weighted portfolio returns. We estimate the model using a rolling window of 24 monthly observations, and plot 
the 95 % confidence bands (2 standard errors) indicating historical periods of risk-adjusted returns significantly different from 
zero, at the 5 % level. 
 
Figure 4.8 
PE/VC IPOs Value-Weighted Time-Varying Alpha Estimates 
The graphs display the development in PE/VC IPOs time-varying alpha estimates using the extended Fama and French-model 
on value weighted portfolio returns. We estimate the model using a rolling window of 24 monthly observations, and plot the 
95 % confidence bands (2 standard errors) indicating historical periods of risk-adjusted returns significantly different from 
zero, at the 5 % level. 
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The PE/VC portfolios also show generally positive exposures to the SMB factor (Figure 4.14), 
with the exception of the period covering the dot.com-bubble, while the exposures to the HML 
factor (Figure 4.15) is significantly negative prior to- and during the dot.com-bubble for both 
large- and small capitalization firms. This seems natural, as many funds invested in growth 
firms prior to the crash. Additionally, large PE/VC IPOs tilted significantly towards liquid 
stocks in the period between the 2008 financial crisis, up until 201146 when the OSEBX 
approached levels resembling those prior to the crisis. This contrasts to the period leading up 
to the dot.com-bubble, were PE/VC-backed firms displayed higher exposure towards illiquid 
firms than the index. This seems natural, as small growth firms usually trades less frequently 
than large value-firms. Full sample regressions reveals that large IPO firms tilt negatively 
towards past losers, returning a negative coefficient on the UMD factor. Most of this effect 
originates from a short period following the 2008 financial crisis. 
Panel B) NB IPOs 
NB IPOs’ annualized alpha-estimates ranges from -7,2 % to 2,4 %. While statistically 
insignificant, the range is narrower than for the PE/VC sample. We observe similar results 
from the FF3EW model for the NB sample, as the estimated alpha’s p-value borders at 
significance on a 10 % level (10,4 %), with an annualized value of -7,44 %. The 5-factor model 
yields beta values that indicate consistent full market exposure, which is natural, as NB IPOs 
closely resemble the OSEBX index. In periods where PE/VC IPOs exhibit declining market 
exposure, the NB IPOs does not differ significantly from full exposure (β = 1). NB IPOs also 
seem to tilt towards illiquid stocks, at least among smaller IPOs, which also seems natural 
given that the sample contains a larger number of illiquid stocks than the PE/VC sample, and 
relative to the OSEBX.    
Time varying alpha-estimates in Figure 4.9 and 4.10 reveal that NB IPOs have experienced 
less negative alphas in both magnitude and frequency. Both NB portfolios consistently display 
higher/less-negative exposures to the risk factors. 
                                                 
46 We excluded the graphs displaying the time-varying exposures to liquidity and momentum. These are available upon 
request.  
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Figure 4.9 
NB IPOs Equally Weighted Time-Varying Alpha Estimates 
The graphs display the development in NB IPOs time-varying alpha estimates using the extended Fama and French-model 
on equally weighted portfolio returns. We estimate the model using a rolling window of 24 monthly observations, and plot 
the 95 % confidence bands (2 standard errors) indicating historical periods of risk-adjusted returns significantly different from 
zero, at the 5 % level. 
 
Figure 4.10 
NB IPOs Value Weighted Time-Varying Alpha Estimates 
The graphs display the development in NB IPOs time-varying alpha estimates using the extended Fama and French-model 
on value weighted portfolio returns. We estimate the model using a rolling window of 24 monthly observations, and plot the 
95 % confidence bands (2 standard errors) indicating historical periods of risk-adjusted returns significantly different from 
zero, at the 5 % level. 
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Panel C) Difference between PE/VC and NB IPOs 
Our estimated models find no significant differences in alphas, when applying the full sample 
period. However, for the two portfolios exhibiting generally polarizing performance, the 
PE/VC and NB VW portfolios; the FF5VW-model estimate a negative alpha (-1,14 %, monthly) 
with a p-value of 15,1 %, indicating borderline significant poorer performance of larger PE/VC 
IPOs, relative to larger NB IPOs. Even though our estimates fail to find any significant alphas 
for either IPO group, the time-varying estimates show a substantial difference in the aftermath 
of the 2008 financial crises, where NB IPOs outperform PE/VC IPOs, especially larger issues 
(Figure 4.12).  
Figure 4.11 
Excess PE/VC IPOs Equally Weighted Time-Varying Alpha Estimates 
The graphs display the development of the excess PE/VC IPOs time-varying alpha estimates using the extended Fama and 
French-model on equally weighted portfolio returns. We estimate the model using a rolling window of 24 monthly 
observations, and plot the 95 % confidence bands (2 standard errors) indicating historical periods where risk-adjusted returns 
for PE/VC IPOs were significantly different from NB IPOs, at the 5 % level. 
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Figure 4.12 
Excess PE/VC IPOs Value Weighted Time-Varying Alpha Estimates 
The graphs display the development of the excess PE/VC IPOs time-varying alpha estimates using the extended Fama and 
French-model on value weighted portfolio returns. We estimate the model using a rolling window of 24 monthly observations, 
and plot the 95 % confidence bands (2 standard errors) indicating historical periods where risk-adjusted returns for large 
PE/VC IPOs were significantly different from large NB IPOs, at the 5 % level. 
 
Below, we have supplied the regressions outputs from the multi-factor estimates, showing 
periods of over/under-exposure to systematic risk factors.  
Figure 4.13 
Time-Varying Factor Exposures to the Markets Excess Return 
The graphs display the time-varying development of the factor exposures of all portfolios to the markets excess return, 
applying the Fama and French extended model. We estimate the model using a rolling window of 24 monthly observations. 
The graph display exposure to the market risk premium (β) in excess of one, which is full market exposure.   
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Figure 4.14 
Time-Varying Factor Exposures to the SMB Portfolio 
The graphs display the time-varying development of the factor exposures of all portfolios to the SMB portfolio, applying the 
Fama and French extended model. We comprise the SMB portfolio by taking a long position in the OSESX index and a short 
position in the OBX index. We estimate the model using a rolling window of 24 monthly observations.  
 
Figure 4.15 
Time-Varying Factor Exposures to the HML Portfolio 
The graphs display the time-varying development of the factor exposures of all portfolios to the HML portfolio, applying the 
Fama and French extended model. We obtain the HML portfolio from Ødegaards’ website, and estimate the model using a 
rolling window of 24 monthly observations.  
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The decreasing and increasing market exposure of PE/VC IPOs seems to align nicely with 
periods of positive equity returns, except for the period of 2004/2005. Evaluating whether or 
not this reflects a proactive or reactive response to market sentiment by PE/VC portfolio firms, 
is beyond the scope of our thesis, but would further indicate to what extent the guidance of PE 
and VC facilitates long-run returns. We believe the portfolio firms’ returns post IPO most 
likely reflects market sentiment rather than the effect of active management involvement. 
Interestingly, the value-weighted PE/VC portfolio exhibits virtually no market exposure 
during the dot.com-bubble and subsequent to the subprime lending crisis of 2008. Both larger 
and smaller PE/VC IPOs tilt significantly towards growth firms prior to the dot.com bubble, 
while quickly reverting a value-tilt subsequent to the crash. Also, leading up to the financial 
crisis of 2008, larger PE/VC IPOs display significant exposure to the value- and market-factor, 
while this development abruptly ends with the market downturn in 2008. At the end of 2012, 
larger PE/VCs’ market exposure has increased to similar levels. 
5.4 Summary of Hypotheses’ Results 
Below, we summarize our findings from the hypotheses formulated in section 2.4, displayed 
in Figure 3.1. 
5.4.1 Underpricing 
H1:  PE/VC IPOs do not exhibit lower underpricing than NB IPOs. 
We keep the null hypothesis for both equally- and value weighted samples, stating equal 
average level of underpricing across IPO groups (5 % and 10 % level). 
H2:  Risk does not affect the level of underpricing 
We reject the null stating that risk does not affect the level of underpricing (5 % level).  
H3:  Market capitalization does not explain differences in levels of underpricing 
We keep the null, stating that market capitalization does not explain differences in levels of 
underpricing (5 % and 10 % level). 
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5.4.2 Long-Run Performance 
H4:  PE/VC IPOs do not exhibit better long-run performance than NB IPOs. 
We keep the null stating that PE/VC-backed firms do not exhibit better long-run performance 
than NB firms. While we do not perform t-tests on the differences between CARs, as the 
sample-sizes differs considerably, we observe a substantial negative performance of both 
PE/VC IPO portfolios, where especially large firms underperforms both the index and the 
other IPO portfolios.  
H5:  Risk-adjusted returns does not differ across PE/VC- and NB IPO portfolios.  
While the full sample regressions returns insignificant differences in alphas, the time-varying 
rolling regressions display significant poorer performance of PE/VC IPOs in the period 
following the 2008 financial crisis, up until 2011, especially for larger IPOs. Additionally, 
PE/VC IPOs underperforms significantly, relative to NB IPOs during two short periods, one 
in 1998 and one in 2004. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis, while adding that there is 
significant time-variation in both risk-exposures and performance differences (5 % level) 
H6:  Market capitalization has no effect on long-run performance. 
We reject the null stating that market capitalization has no effect of long-run performance. 
However, the effect of market capitalization moves in opposite directions across IPOs. The 
time-varying rolling regressions indicates that the largest PE/VC firms significantly 
underperforms relative to the index and all other IPOs in certain periods, while the largest NB 
IPOs displays the best performance among the IPO groups. The CAR calculations support this 
view. Small capitalization firms across samples display similar performance patterns, though 
the PE/VC IPOs performs marginally worse than small capitalization NB IPOs.   
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6. Conclusion 
6.1 Underpricing 
The original data suggests that larger PE/VC IPOs exhibit severe underperformance relative 
to other portfolios, in event time. However, subsequent to adjusting the samples for outliers, 
we observe that average underpricing of PE/VC-backed IPOs declines below that of NB IPOs, 
both for the equally- and value-weighted portfolios. However, we are unable to find 
statistically significant differences. We find that risk affect the level of underpricing on firm 
level, after adjusting for outliers, while size and PE/VC-involvement seems to be insignificant. 
Calendar time portfolios does not reveal any major differences in the level of underpricing 
across years, when accounting for the relative sample sizes representing the yearly IPO 
cohorts.   
6.2 Long-Run Performance 
We apply several methods when assessing the long-run performance of each IPO group, both 
individually and comparatively. The cumulative abnormal returns reveals severe 
underperformance of larger PE/VC-backed IPOs, both relative to the index and to all other 
IPOs. Smaller PE/VC-backed IPOs display significant underperformance relative to the 
OSEBX, while only marginally worse than smaller NB IPOs. Larger NB IPOs performs better 
than all other IPOs, and not significantly different from the OSEBX index. The results are 
robust to outliers, besides for larger NB IPOs, which also underperforms relative to the 
OSEBX, when applying symmetrical trimming. Additionally, the short-term abnormal 
performance of the larger PE/VC IPO portfolio disappears when we account for outliers, 
mainly because Renewable Energy Corporation is removed from the sample.  
At first glance, the BHR calculations display widely differing wealth relatives across time, 
between IPO groups. However, most of the years displaying pronounced differences in IPO 
cohorts’ wealth relatives, suffers from small sample sizes. In the remaining periods, 
differences usually arise due to market dynamics rather than influence from active ownership. 
PE/VC IPOs display somewhat higher wealth relatives than NB IPOs in the short term, while 
NB IPOs’ long-term wealth relatives exceed those of PE/VC IPOs, on average. 
  
108
Our risk-adjusted returns calculations find annualized alphas ranging from -10,8 % to 7,2% 
for PE/VC IPOs, across all models and both PE/VC portfolios. Even though none of the 
models yields significant alphas, the Fama-French 3-factor model (FF3EW) estimate an 
annualized alpha of -9,6 %, borderline significant on a 10 % level. NB IPOs’ annualized alphas 
ranges from -7,2 % to 2,4 %. We observe similar results with regards to the significance of the 
NB sample’s alphas as for the PE/VC sample; the FF3EW model estimate an annualized alpha 
of -7,44 % with a p-value of 10,2 %. Regressing on the excess return of PE/VC IPOs for the 
full sample period of 199 months, yields insignificant results concerning differences in returns. 
However, for the value-weighted portfolios, which consistently displays polarizing 
performance, the FF5VW-model return a negative alpha with a p-value of 15,1 %. This indicates 
that PE/VC IPOs underperforms through the full sample period, though on a slightly lower 
level of significance than conventionally applied. 
The monthly time-varying estimates, calculated using rolling regressions, displays a more 
nuanced picture of the relative long-run performance and risk-exposures of all the portfolios.  
Both equally- and value-weighed PE/VC IPOs significantly underperform relative to 
corresponding NB IPOs during the financial crisis of 2008, while displaying relatively better 
performance during the dot.com-bubble. The value-weighted PE/VC IPO portfolio exhibit 
approximately no market exposure during the dot.com-bubble and subsequent to the 2008 
financial crisis, while the exposure increases drastically leading up to the latter one. However, 
declining market exposure during 2004/2005, might contribute towards the observed 
underperformance, as this period provided favourable equity returns. The equally-weighted 
PE/VC portfolio rarely exhibits beta values significantly different from one. Both larger and 
smaller PE/VC IPO portfolios display a significant tilt towards growth firms prior to the dot-
com-bubble, while reverting towards value-firms after the market downturn in 2001. Leading 
up to the 2008 financial crisis, larger PE/VC IPOs display a significant positive exposure to 
the value- and market factor, while abruptly declining subsequent to the crisis. At the end of 
2012, larger PE/VCs’ market exposure has increased to similar levels.  
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7. Appendix 
7.1 Cross-Sectional OLS  Multiple Regression Model 
Assumptions (Gauss-Markov Theorem; 1-5) 
1) The population model can be stated as follows 
 
𝑦𝑖 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑥𝑖1 +  𝛽2𝑥𝑖2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑖𝑘 + 𝑢𝑖   
 
where 𝛽0, … , 𝛽𝑘 are 𝑘 + 1 unknown population parameters, and 𝑢 is an unobserved 
random error term.  
2) We have a random sample of size 𝑛, {(𝑥𝑖1, … , 𝑥𝑖𝑘, 𝑦𝑖) ∶ 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛} 
3) In the sample (and in the population), none of the independent variables are constant, 
and there is no exact linear relationships among the independent variables 
(collinearity). 
4) Zero Conditional Mean: 𝐸(𝑢|𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑘) = 0 
5) Constant variance: 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢|𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑘) =  𝜎
2   
6) The population error 𝑢 is independent of the explanatory variables 𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑘 and is 
normally distributed with mean zero and variance 𝜎2. 
𝑢 ~ 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(0, 𝜎2), “the error term is independent and identically distributed.  
This assumption is required when conducting inference.  
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7.2 Diagnostic Plots of Residuals 
Figure 6.1 
Diagnostic Plots of Residuals for Evaluating Homoskedasticity 
The graph on the left display the original underpricing sample’s residuals. The graph on the right display the underpricing 
sample’s residuals after we removed the initial returns of Camposol (413,27 %) and Norwegian Applied Technology (145,92 
%). 
 
 
7.3 Diagnostics: Normality of Residuals 
Figure 6.3 
Normality of Residuals, Original and Adjusted Samples 
The graph on the left display the original underpricing sample’s residuals density distribution together with the normal density 
distribution given the sample’s mean and variance. The graph on the right display the underpricing sample’s residuals density 
distribution after we removed the initial returns of Camposol (413,27 %) and Norwegian Applied Technology (145,92 %), 
along with the resulting normal density distribution.  
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7.4 Time Series OLS Regression Model Assumptions 
Assumption 1) The model is linear in parameters 
With the regression represented in the form of 
𝑦 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑥 + 𝑢 
u represents the error term, containing factors other than x, affecting y. With u fixed, x has a 
linear effect on y. This is not as restrictive as it may seem, as both x and y can be redefined to 
take account of non-linearities, for example in logarithmic form.   
Assumption 2) There is no perfect collinearity among the explanatory variables 
The assumption requires some variation in the explanatory variables, but also restrict perfect 
correlation between them, in other words, no explanatory variable should be a perfect linear 
function of the others. High degree of correlation between the explanatory variables is on the 
other hand often an issue with time series data.  
Assumption 3) The Zero Conditional Mean Assumption 
Often called the strict exogeneity assumption, requiring that ut is uncorrelated with all the 
independent variables at all t, past and future values.   
Assumption 4) Homoscedasticity 
Requires constant variance of the error terms. In other words, the variance cannot depend on 
x, and do not change over time.  
Assumption 5) No serial correlation (Autocorrelation)  
The error terms cannot correlate over time. If Corr(ut, xt) ≠ 0, the errors are serially correlated, 
which effect inference though invalid t-statistics and standard errors.  
Assumption 6) Normally distributed error terms 
ut is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) as Normal (0, σ2), t = 1, 2, …, n. This 
assumption is necessary if we are to conduct correct inference.  
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7.5 IPO Firm- and PE/VC Fund Information  
Table 6.1 
PE/VC Firms with Fund and GP Information 
The list displays IPOs backed by PEs/VCs and which fund that has been active prior to the IPO. Company names in 
parenthesis reflects the companies last known name in Datastream, either subsequent to a name change or prior to delisting. 
Where names are missing, we have been unable to identify which fund that had been involved.    
 
Listing Date Company Fund Managers Fund Name
06.10.2010 CellCura ASA Maturo Kapital BTV-Fond
21.05.2010 Bridge Energy ASA Lime Rock Partners Lime Rock Partners lll
05.02.2010 North Energy ASA ProNord Kap Nord Fond
22.07.2008 Global IP Solutions Holding AB Kistefos Venture Capital Kistefos Venture Capital
09.11.2007 Norwegian Energy Company ASA (Noreco)HitecVision HitecVision III
11.10.2007 Pronova BioPharma ASA Herkules Capital Herkules Private Equity Fund I
12.06.2007 Badger Explorer ASA Convexa Capital, Procom Venture Convexa Capital IV AS, Procom Venture AS, 
Convexa Capital II AS
06.06.2007 InvivoSense ASA Viking Venture Management Viking Venture I 
31.05.2007 SCAN Geophysical ASA Norvestor Equity Norvestor IV LP
30.03.2007 Electromagnetic Geoservices ASA Warburg Pincus -
27.03.2007 Algeta ASA HealthCap Venture Capital, 
NorgesInvestor, Incitia Ventures, Advent 
Venture Partners
Healthcap, NorgesInvestor III, Selvaag Venture 
Capital (Incita), Advent Venture Partners
23.03.2007 NEAS ASA Reiten & Co Capital Partners Nordic Capital Partners IV
21.12.2006 Reservoir Exploration Technology ASA Lime Rock Partners -
10.11.2006 AKVA group ASA Norvestor Equity Norvestor Fund l
12.10.2006 Marine Farms ASA Marin Forvaltning Marin Vekst I
07.07.2006 Clavis Pharma ASA Neomed Management NeoMed Innovation III LP
05.07.2006 Trolltech ASA Teknoinvest Management, Northzone 
Ventures
Teknoinvest VIII KS, Northzone III
03.07.2006 AGR (Ability Group) Altor Equity Partners -
09.05.2006 Renewable Energy Corporation ASA Hafslund Venture -
14.12.2005 NorDiag ASA (NORD) Procom Venture SåkorninVest
13.12.2005 Funcom N.V. Northzone Ventures, Nordic Venture 
Partners, Teknoinvest
Northzone IV K/S, Nordic Venture Partners II
12.12.2005 Grenland Group (Agility Group) NorgesInvestor NorgesInvestor II
06.12.2005 Future Information Research Management 
ASA (FIRM)
Norvestor Equity -
18.11.2005 Odim ASA Verdane Capital -
04.11.2005 Biotec Pharmacon ASA Norgesinvestor, Verdane Capital
24.10.2005 Cermaq ASA NorgesInvestor NorgesInvestor II
24.10.2005 Powel ASA Viking Venture Management, Norvestor 
Equity
Viking Venture I
27.06.2005 Revus Energy ASA HitecVision HitecVision Private Equity III
24.06.2005 Kongsberg Automotive Holding ASA IK Investment Partners,FSN Capital 
Partners
FSN Capital I, IK Investment Partners unkown
09.06.2005 VIA Travel Group (VIA Egencia) NorgesInvestor NorgesInvestor III
26.04.2005 Polimoon ASA (Promens) CVC Capital Partners -
04.04.2005 IMAREX (International Maritime Exchange 
ASA)
Incitia Ventures, R S Plateou Venutre 
Capital
Selvaag Venture Capital (Incitia), R S Plateou 
Venture Capital
18.03.2005 APL ASA HitecVision, Energy Ventures HitecVision III,
27.01.2005 DynaPel Systems, Inc. Verdane Capital -
17.12.2004 Bjørge ASA Norvestor Equity Norvestor Fund l
12.11.2004 Active 24 ASA (Før Active ISP) Verdane Capital, European Capital 
Ventures
Four Seasons Venture ll, European Capital Ventures 
PLC
06.07.2004 Privatbanken ASA Altatria Altaria SMB I
04.06.2004 AXXESSIT ASA Convexa Capital,Ferd Capital NorgesInvestor Vekst,Convexa Capital Fund, Ferd 
Capital
25.05.2004 Findexa Limited Texas Pacific Group -
10.05.2004 Mamut ASA Northzone Ventures Northzone II
29.03.2004 Catch Communications ASA Kistefos Group Kistefos Venture Capital
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7.6 Frequency- and Normal Distributions for Underpricing 
Data 
 
11.03.2004 Opera Software ASA Teknoinvest Management, Verdane Capital KS Teknoinvest VII, Four Seasons Venture III AS, 
Teknoinvest VIII KS, Four Seasons Venture II AS, 
KS Teknoinvest VI, Norgesinvestor Vekst AS
19.12.2003 NextGenTel Holding ASA Northzone Ventures Northzone III
08.04.2002 Apptix ASA Convexa Capital Convexa Capital
03.04.2002 Q-Free ASA TeleVenture Management Telenor Venture II
13.06.2001 Consorte Group ASA (Intelecom) NorgesInvestor NorgesInvestor II
10.05.2001 Scribona AB Norvestor Equity Norvestor Fund ll
29.06.2000 TeleComputing Convexa Capital Convexa Capital Fund
19.06.2000 Customax NorgesInvestor NorgesInvestor I
19.06.2000 Webcenter Solutions (Webcenter Unqiue, 
Mefjord)
Norvestor Equity Norvestor Fund l
29.05.2000 PhotoCure Bio Fund Management, Teknoinvest Bio Fund Ventures I, Teknoinvest fund unknown
14.04.2000 Expert Eilag NorgesInvestor NorgesInvestor I
14.03.2000 Stepstone Northzone Ventures, Verdane Capital Northzone I, Four Seasons Venture II
13.07.1999 Infostream Verdane Capital -
02.06.1999 Axis-Shield plc; UK Teknoinvest Management -
08.07.1998 Eltek TeleVenture Management Telenor Venture I
06.07.1998 Synnøve Finden Meierier Norvestor Equity Norvestor Fund l
15.05.1998 Luxo NorgesInvestor NorgesInvestor I
02.04.1998 Scandinavian Retail Group (Voice) Norvestor Equity Norvestor Fund l
23.12.1997 Navis HitecVision -
15.12.1997 Norcool Holding NorgesInvestor NorgesInvestor I
01.10.1997 Iterated Systems, USD ( MediaBin) Teknoinvest Management -
01.07.1997 Pan Fish (Marine Harvest) Norvestor Equity Norvestor Fund l
27.06.1997 EDB Norvestor Equity Norvestor Fund l
11.06.1997 CorrOcean (Roxar) Norvestor Equity Norvestor Fund l
22.05.1996 Agresso (Unit4 Agresso) Verdane Capital -
25.04.1996 Provida Verdane Capital -
0
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7.7 Test for Auto-Correlation 
 
1) We estimate the equation: 𝑦𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑥𝑡1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑡𝑘 + 𝑢𝑡 , 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑛, by OLS and save the 
residuals, {?̂?𝑡: 𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛}.  
2) Then we estimate: ?̂?𝑡  𝑜𝑛 ?̂?𝑡−1, 𝑥𝑡1, 𝑥𝑡2, … , 𝑥𝑡𝑘, 𝑡 = 2, … , 𝑛. 
3) Finally, we compute the heteroskedasticity-robust t statistic for the coefficient in front of ?̂?𝑡−1, and  
test: 𝐻0 ∶  𝜌 = 0. 
7.8 Dickey Fuller-Tests for Unit Root 
 
 
F-Value Prob > F F-Value Prob > F F-Value Prob > F
PE_EW 2,69 0,1026 1,89 0,1713 2,20 0,1396
PE_VW 0,08 0,7818 0,24 0,6218 0,00 0,9893
NB_EW 0,14 0,7094 0,74 0,39 1,35 0,2473
NB_VW 0,39 0,5309 0,38 0,54 0,37 0,5422
PEEW-NBEW 1,44 0,2311 2,00 0,159 1,93 0,1661
PEVW-NBVW 0,10 0,7476 0,80 0,371 0,21 0,6486
CAPM FF3 FF5
Data Series Test Statistic 1 %  Critical Value 5 %  Critical Value 10%  Critical Value
PE_EW -8.937 -3.477 -2.883 -2.573
PE_VW -10.993 -3.477 -2.883 -2.573
NB_EW -8.946 -3.478 -2.883 -2.573
NB_VW -9.697 -3.479 -2.883 -2.573
RM -10.503 -3.480 -2.883 -2.573
OSESX-OBX -18.610 -3.481 -2.883 -2.573
HML -12.636 -3.482 -2.883 -2.573
UMD -13.233 -3.483 -2.883 -2.573
LIQ -14.928 -3.484 -2.883 -2.573
PEEW_NBEW -15.735 -3.485 -2.883 -2.573
PEVW_NBVW -14.461 -3.486 -2.883 -2.573
